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Abstract 
The notion of citizenship, while a basic human right, has come under scrutiny. It 
was once assumed a liberal inspired regime of citizenship rights would reign as the 
primary ideological perspective in the Western world, however this has not been the 
case. Numerous competing paradigms have questioned the premise upon which liberal 
guarantees of citizenship rights are based. In particular, communitarianism has subjected 
liberal rights discourse to a closer examination. Communitarian theory holds that 
universalist principles negate any articulation of community and its internal diversity, 
such as cultural citizenship. It is this understanding of citizenship that has taken hold in 
Canada. 
The Canadian political experience illustrates a number of attributes associated 
with communitarian thought. It is a collectivist society that articulates a notion of the 
common good, acknowledges the internal diversity of its citizens and possesses a highly 
developed deliberative democratic process. To this end, Canada can be described as 
being more communitarian than liberal in nature in the process it has adopted to address 
citizenship rights. However, the type of commuIiitarianism displayed in Canada differs 
from the political models examined by such scholars as Michael Sandel, Iris Marion 
Young or Will Kymlicka. 
Cultural citizenship rights are fluid and malleable in Canada. While no clear 
guarantees of citizenship rights exist, there is a common commitment by Canadians to 
engage in a fair, open and inclusive deliberative process. This model is unique to 
Canada; it cannot be exported in that it is a product of Canadian political culture. As a 
result, the contemporary demands of cultural citizenship are dealt with effectively and 
democratically in Canada in that the proper mechanisms for public deliberation exist. 
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Introduction 
Liberal-democratic states and their respective institutions owe much of their form 
and function to the philosophic outgrowths spawned by the Enlightenment. From this 
period on, liberalism has prevailed as the primary ideological paradigm to the extent that 
some scholars have suggested that most of the major philosophical questions have been 
settled. In particular, this thesis is supported by Francis Fukuyama, who has suggested in 
The End of History and the Last Man, that with the fall of Eastern European 
communism, the fundamentals of liberalism have become widely accepted and adopted. 
Fukuyama suggests that major moral and ethical debates have been decided to a large 
extent. Consequently, Fukuyama points out that political communities have become more 
homogenous and unique identities have become lost. 1 However, while there is merit in 
Fukuyama's argument, the boundaries of liberalism have not expanded unimpeded. 
Notions of citizenship based upon liberal principles have not taken complete hold. While 
Fukuyama is correct that ideological conflicts have diminished with the fall of 
communism, they have been replaced by an ever-growing collection of ethnic conflicts. 
The citizens of Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, or a variety of many other multi ethnic 
nations have not easily prescribed to liberal inspired ideals of citizenship. Specifically 
this has occurred because liberalism has not traditionally recognized, nor addressed, any 
real notions of cultural citizenship. It is upon this point that many critiques have emerged 
challenging a liberal conception of justice. In place of traditional liberalism, post-
1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon, 1993) p. xii 
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modernism, communitarianism, classical Aristotelian perspectives, as well as a host of 
other hybrid models, have attempted to recognize the role cultural citizenship plays III 
modem liberal-democracies. 
The need to disseminate or at least acknowledge a regime of citizenship rights is 
not wholly an academic exercise. Rather, managing cultural diversity is an essential 
requirement in the maintenance of a functional contemporary democratic system. The 
decline of ideological paradigms, coupled with the advent of improved transportation and 
communication technologies, have required the adoption of perspectives that allow for 
the incorporation of cultural citizenship rights within the frameworks of modem states. 
Michael Sandel points to the European Community as representing this situation. If the 
European experiment of supranational government is to succeed it must cultivate a civic 
culture that incorporates, quoting Czech president Vaclav Havel, "the values from which 
the spirit and ethos of European integration might grow. ,,2 This European identity must 
include an understanding and respect for differentiated cultural values and norms in order 
to take root. Many smaller European nations do have legitimate concerns that with the 
erosion of national borders, larger cultural groups, such as Germans or the English, may 
come to dominate the political, thus cultural, affairs of the continent. 
The examination of cultural citizenship is a real issue that has moved beyond the 
realm of political theory. The demands of cultural citizenship now influence the 
direction of policy development and implementation of many liberal-democratic 
governments. Issues ranging from the socio-economic impacts of cultural imports to 
2 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press, 1996), p. 339 
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actual violence between competing cultural groups have emerged as real concerns that 
must be addressed. Though Canada is not immune from these challenges, they are not 
inherently new to the Canadian political scene; they have been an integral part of the 
Canadian social fabric for centuries. Canada merits a detailed examination, in that while 
it recognizes cultural citizenship, often a divisive avenue, it maintains a healthy and 
vibrant democracy. Canada does not follow in the tradition of other Western liberal-
democracies; its unique history necessitated a need for an open discourse surrounding the 
distribution of cultural citizenship rights. In this respect, Canada is better described as 
following in the tenets of communitarian thought. It is a collectivist society that 
articulates a notion of the common good, acknowledges the internal diversity of its 
citizens and possesses a highly developed deliberative democratic process. 
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Chapter One 
The Evolution of the Canadian Condition 
In the sphere of political thought, Canada is not often exemplified as a real and 
contemporary model of communitarianism. It cannot be disputed that Canadian political 
institutions are inherently based upon the traditional principles associated with liberal-
democracy. However, beyond their mere liberal-democratic surface, Canada does not 
readily follow in either American or European traditions. In particular John Ralston Saul 
writes in Reflections of a Siamese Dream; Canada at the End of the Twentieth Century, 
Canada is profoundly un-European. Its attitudes and polices are largely the 
product of local circumstances, in part because we have constructed a country 
on the margins of Western civilization .. .It (Canada) is not, nor was it ever a 
rational project. The contradictions within the process-the regional, linguistic 
and cultural differences-have largely been accepted as characteristics of the 
nation rather than obstacles to its creation3 
Saul indicates that Canada, through the conditions of history it has inherited, has 
always needed to actively manage issues of diversity. Saul suggests that Canada does 
not follow in the traditional political ideals espoused by the Enlightenment. The 
historical "local circumstances" Saul eludes to merit a detailed comparison between 
Canada and more classically liberal political cultures, in particular the United States. 
The seminal work that empirically examines and establishes the key differences 
between both cultures is found in Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the 
United States and Canada, authored by Seymour Martin Lipset. Through Lipset's work, 
3 John Ralston Saul, Reflections of a Siamese Dream: Canada at the End of the Twentieth Century 
(Toronto: Viking, 1997) pp. 102-103 
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concrete differences in political attitudes and values are highlighted between Canada and 
the United States. Lipset finds that individualism, influenced directly by Lockean 
liberalism, runs less rampant in Canada than it does in the United States. He comments, 
"America reflects the influence of its classically liberal, Whig, individualistic, antistatist, 
populist...Canada has been and is a more class-aware, elitist, law-abiding, statist, 
collectively-oriented, and particularistic (group-oriented) society than the United 
States. ,,4 This general characterization reveals that though both do exhibit the hallmarks 
associated with liberal democracies, Canada does not purely focus upon individualism; a 
balance is maintained between individual liberty and the collective good. 
The political culture associated with Canada does bear a resemblance to the 
values of community espoused by communitarians in that collectivist tendencies are 
clearly evident. However, this "sense of togetherness" and common purpose cannot be 
merely created; it must be cultivated and nurtured. It should not be misunderstood that 
Canada's collectivist political culture is directly influenced by any communitarian vision, 
but rather it exists as a result of numerous conditions of history as Saul claims. Various 
elements have merged over the centuries to produce this uniquely Canadian political 
culture. Kenneth McRae, in Louis Hartz's The Founding of New Societies, further 
outlines this thesis. The author points out that neither of Canada's founding French nor 
English cultural communities have subscribed to any radical notions of individualism. 
The populace of Quebec was never exposed to a philosophy of liberation espoused by the 
French Revolution, in that by 1789, the colony was no longer connected politically to 
4 Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada 
(New York: Routledge, 1990) p. 8 
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France. Conversely, many United Empire Loyalists, in rejecting the republican values 
that emerged with the American Revolution, migrated to the British Empire's remaining 
colonies in North America. The merging of these two distinct elements into a single 
political system is the basis upon which contemporary Canadian values and attitudes are 
derived.S This historical process has had a direct effect upon the political landscape in 
that it has allowed socialism to prosper in the same political arena as Tory-influenced 
conservativism. Both doctrines, though in many respects ideologically opposite, place a 
greater emphasis upon societal interests than the individual good.6 It must also be noted, 
that while Canada's earlier history saw a merging of ideologically compatible 
components, it has always had to balance the collective good with internal cultural 
demands. The dominant cultural groups of pre-Confederation Canada, British and 
French, both sought to secure and sustain their own distinct cultural identities. To this 
end, the notion of the collective good has never been rigid in espousing a single regime 
of citizenship for all. It is on this particular point that liberals and communitarians 
diverge. Notions of individuality and community deeply influence both respective 
approaches in, not only outlining the bounds of justice as a whole, but the approach taken 
to managing cultural citizenship as well. This is best exemplified through a historic 
examination of rights discourse in North America. 
The United States has endured a tormented history with regard to addressing the 
needs of cultural groups. With the independence of the American colonies in 1776, a 
5 Kenneth D. McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History" in The Founding of New Societies, Louis Hartz, 
ed., (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964) pp. 218-248 
6 Lipset, pp. 149-150 
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political culture deeply immersed in liberalism was born. From its beginnings, American 
political values and social attitudes have reinforced the political ideal that "all men are 
created equal", as articulated in the First Article of the Bill of Rights. Even in its earliest 
forms, liberalism has endorsed a condition of equality based upon the equal moral worth 
of every individual. However in practice, citizenship was restrictive in that it excluded 
women, African-Americans and Native Americans. This status is explicitly mentioned in 
the Constitution of the United States that notes that for the purposes of determining the 
electoral representation of the states, African-American non-citizens were to be 
considered "three fifths of a person". 7 The quantification of moral worth by 
contemporary standards, both liberal and communitarian, is deemed inherently unjust. 
According to Gunnar Myrdal, such an obvious contradiction of liberal-democratic values 
and existing societal prejudices could not endure. The denial of basic civil liberties could 
not last in that it violated the very egalitarian character upon which America based its 
creed.8 Consequently, numerous amendments have been made to the American 
constitution, prompted by both social activism and civil war. However, while 
historically certain persons were denied citizenship rights based solely upon social group 
membership, the eventual inclusion of cultural minorities is based upon the liberal idea 
of the fundamental equality of all individuals. However, it is this perception of the 
individual as the primary social and political unit that manycommunitarians reject. They 
suggest that not all citizens see themselves solely as autonomous individuals. 
7 See The Constitution of the United States for more detail 
8 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) pp. 460-462 
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Communitarians suggest that by ignoring group-membership as a social reality, liberal 
guarantees of social and political equality are unsatisfactory.9 While liberal guarantees 
of equality do exist, justice cannot be fairly distributed. 
The American experience, often illustrated as a liberal conception of justice 
inadequately addresses the needs of cultural groups. By contrast, the Canadian example 
is cited as being more representative of a regime of citizenship rights that does not focus 
solely upon individual liberty. While the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does 
acknowledge the individual as the primarily the recipient of legal, democratic and 
equality rights, it does make specific references to the condition of its component 
cultures as well. Overall it establishes, within a constitutional framework, an 
acknowledgment that both individual and group interests do exist. Specifically, in 
Section 23, the document provides for French and English education rights for linguistic 
minorities. Furthermore, Aboriginal Canadians' current and future rights that may come 
by any land claims settlements are explicitly mentioned as well. Finally, Section 27 
allows for the Charter as a whole to be "interpreted in a manner consistent with the . 
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians."IO This 
approach to cultural citizenship rights was furthered in the drafting of the Meech Lake 
and Charlottetown Accords. While both agreements did meet eventual defeat, they made 
provisions for an increased consideration of Quebec's cultural distinctiveness and a 
greater political recognition the role of First Nations in Canadian society. 
9 Daly, p. xvii 
10 See The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for more detail 
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The recognition of Canada's cultural diversity did not commence with the 
Constitution Act of 1982, but rather can trace its political origins to the Quebec Act of 
1774. The Act allowed the inhabitants of New France to maintain aspects oftheir culture 
such as a civil code, after the conquest of the colony by the British in 1759. This policy 
was not entirely implemented through altruistic sentiments, but rather it seemed a 
reasonable and efficient means of managing the newly acquired colony. I I However, this 
precedent of acknowledging and respecting cultural difference emerged as the dominant 
pattern in the development of not only the Canadian state, but also a national political 
culture. The official union of the Canadas in 1839 furthered the situation as outlined in 
Durham Report. I2 Though intended as a policy of assimilation, political actors from the 
Canadas agreed upon measures to ensure a cultural/political equilibrium was achieved. A 
period of mutual compromise was to result, as illustrated by the altering of the seat of 
government from Kingston to Quebec City every two years. Furthermore, the legislature 
required "double majorities", a majority from both English and French delegates, for the 
fl '1,13 passage 0 egIS atlOn. While Canada is not immune to cultural conflicts, it has 
avoided serious civil strife by openly acknowledging that cultural citizenship is a real 
aspect that must be addressed. While the recognition of differentiated forms of cultural 
citizenship rights has been practised in Canada, the acknowledgment has not come 
without difficulties. Historical notions of what exactly constitutes cultural citizenship 
11 David Bell and Lome Tepperman, The Roots of Disunity (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979) pp, 
115-16 
12 McRae, p, 248-49 
13 Bell and Tepperman, p. 117 
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have been challenged by Canada's changing demographic face. Since the conclusion of 
the Second World War, the majority of new Canadians have arrived from non-European 
nations. However upon their arrival they often find themselves socially and politically 
alienated in that they do not easily adapt to neither French nor English culture. The 
result is the creation of a social hierarchy that has historically placed non-Charter 
Canadians at the bottom, a phenomenon has not escaped the attention of the academic 
community. 
In The Vertical Mosaic, John Porter examines the issue of social class, with 
references to immigration, more closely. Porter suggests that while equality is often 
expressed as a valuable and reasonable political quality, social equality is not a condition 
inherent to the Canadian social fabric. Porter continues by adding that through a larger 
process of social and political marginalization, immigrants often exist as an economic 
underclass as well. 14 Upon their arrival in Canada, immigrants have been employed 
primarily as menial labourers. Furthermore, immigrants who indeed possess professional 
qualifications and post-secondary education have difficulty in obtaining employment at 
their own skill level. 15 The result is a condition of equality that can be defined clearly in 
terms of ethnicity. Porter concludes in The Vertical Mosaic with, 
... The nineteenth-century notion of a liberal citizen-participating democracy is 
obviously not a satisfactory modeL.Given the complexities of modem 
societies it is unlikely that wide spread participation can develop without very 
great changes and experimentation necessary for more democratic industrial 
societies. A fragmented political structure, a lack of upward mobility into its 
14 John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965) p. 84-5 
15 Ibid, p. 53 
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elite and higher occupational levels, and the absence of a clearly articulated 
system of values, stemming from a charter myth or based in an indigenous 
ideology, are some of the reasons for this retardation 16 
In considering Porter's work in its full context, it is an astute analysis of the 
Canadian social condition. However, it should be noted that The Vertical Mosaic is 
dated and does not fully represent a contemporary portrait of Canadian society. 
Published in 1965, The Vertical Mosaic precedes the adoption of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, the advent of official bilingualism and the implementation of an official 
policy of multiculturalism. John Meisel, Porter's editor, himself concedes that a class 
analysis of political values and attitudes has given way to the a greater focus "on the role 
of ethnicity in the functioning of Canadian society.,,17 However Porter's concluding 
statements foreshadow the emergence of a philosophical paradigm that has indeed 
created a national creed. 
Many communitarians would agree with Porter's original assessment that liberal-
democracy has become stagnant in the Canadian context. However, a unique aspect of 
Canadian political culture compliments this. While notions of deliberative democracy 
and distributive justice may highlight the discourse surrounding cultural citizenship, the 
communitarian project in Canada is also marked by a profound adaptability. While 
Porter's original assessment is valid, numerous political developments have occurred 
since the publication of The Vertical Mosaic. The majority of Canadians no longer 
consider themselves a nation composed of "Two Solitudes", existing along a French-
16 Ibid, p. 558 
17 Ibid, p. ix 
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English cultural axis. I8 While the rights of Canada's founding cultures are officially 
recognized, non-Charter cultural groups have been afford a measure of protection as 
well. The introduction of the Multiculturalism Act in 1971 has allowed for the 
acknowledgment of the value of all of Canada's component cultural groups. The concept 
of multiculturalism is a uniquely Canadian social philosophy that specifically values 
cultural diversity as a national resource. In particular, this ideology of multiculturalism 
facilitates the open discussion of issues relating to cultural citizenship, an aspect rarely 
found in other political cultures. Aside from recognizing the inherent moral worth of 
each culture, multiculturalism has become a defining characteristic of the Canadian 
identity; it has received a high degree of political saliency. Augie Fleras and Jean 
Leonard Elliott have likened multiculturalism to that of a national ideology.19 They write 
in Multiculturalism in Canada, 
As an official ideology, multiculturalism embraces a set of ideas and ideals, 
about the nature and characteristics of Canadian unity, identity and self image, 
and well-being. In brief, the ideals of multiculturalism are varied, but are often 
contingent on (a) enhancing individual self-esteem through strong cultural 
identification, (b) eliminating racism through sensitivity to others' needs and 
ambitions, and (c) fostering improved intercultural exchanges through 
increased empathy and understanding. Ideally, a stable and well-regulated 
political unity can be crafted out of diverse elements, providing there is an 
atmosphere oftolerance, accommodation, community, and sharing?O 
Among the nations of the world, such as India or the United States, Canada is 
relatively homogenous, yet it has developed a distinctly multicultural identity. 
18 The term "Two Solitudes" is taken from Hugh MacLennan, Two Solitudes Toronto: MacMillian 
Canada, 1967 
19 Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliott, Multiculturalism in Canada (Toronto, Nelson, 1992) p. 54 
20 Ibid, p. 58 
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Furthermore, cultural diversity is not merely viewed as in terms of creating social justice, 
but an element of nation building. Multiculturalism fosters a social discourse among 
actors who may not necessarily share a common cultural heritage. While these 
differences exist, they do not necessarily hinder the articulation of an eventual social 
consensus regarding the common good. The tolerance of difference that is encouraged 
by the value system associated with multiculturalism allows for openness in public 
communication as a key element of a deliberative democracy. While the Canadian model 
does function, it cannot be assumed that it has met with full success in addressing the 
varying needs of cultural actors. Critics suggest that the deliberative model adopted by 
Canada and the ensuing social discourse found in Canada, can accentuate cultural 
difference and exacerbate conditions of prejudice and discrimination. 
The demographic face of Canada has changed in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Recent immigrants to Canada have arrived from Asia, Africa, South America 
and the Caribbean, and as a result many of Canada's cultural minorities exist as visible 
minorities as well.21 Canada's growing cultural diversity has ramifications for the means 
by society is perceived and understood. One can reasonably expect that these 
perceptions are both positive and negative in nature, the latter taking the form of 
stereotypes, prejudices, and discrimination. Aggregate data suggests that visible 
minorities as a whole do experience the effects of prejudice more than others in Canadian 
society. While on average visible minorities, most of whom are immigrants, are 7% 
more likely to hold a university degree than the average Canadian, the unemployment 
21 Ibid, p. 39 
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rate for visible minorities stood at 13% in 1991 while the national average was 10%.22 
When specific groups are analyzed, the discrepancy is even greater. Those defined as 
West Asian, South East Asian, Latin American and Black experience rates of 
unemployment at well above 15% on the whole. Evidence exists that while more 
educated than the national average, this does not materialize into proportional 
employment opportunities for visible minorities.23 It should be noted that factors such as 
an inability to speak French or English, as in the case of recent immigrants, may 
influence visible minorities capacity to attain employment. However, this cannot 
completely disregard the role discrimination plays in encumbering a person's social 
mobility because of their cultural heritage. 
It would be erroneous to assume that a communitarian understanding of the 
contemporary Canadian condition easily facilitates a just community. However, a model 
that endorses cultural openness should not be understood in terms of achieving a final 
result, but as a continuous social process. Communitarians suggest that such a process is 
better equipped to address and reduce cultural tensions. Prejudicial attitudes and 
discriminatory behaviour are often not based upon a conscious malice or hatred of a 
specific cultural group, but rather stereotypes are associated with social ignorance.24 
Communitarian theory suggests that a process of open communication can better mediate 
social conflict than any liberal model based on a difference-blind principle. 
22 Alan Frizzell and Jon H. Pammett, ed. Social Inequality in Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 
1996) p. 23 
23 Ibid, pp. 23-4 
24 Alastair Bonnett, Anti-Racism (London: Routledge, 2000) pp. 90-2 
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Communitarianism holds that the difference-blind principle has ignored real social 
differences, and as a result does not encourage a social dialogue regarding issues 
pertaining to cultural diversity. 
The notion that social and political deliberation is encouraged by the ideology of 
multiculturalism has been empirically documented. Research data suggests that in fact 
the recognition of diversity does not alienate cultural actors from another, but in reality 
encourages cross-cultural interaction and greater social mobility, in particular for visible 
minorities. John C. Harles has examined the ability of immigrants to integrate into 
Canadian society and concludes that "the process of immigration itself, ... combined with 
policies of multiculturalism aimed at easing the transition of newcomers to Canada, can 
have a politically integrative effect. ,,25 Harles emphasizes the point that multiculturalism 
is a functional aspect associated with the Canadian identity, not merely a national myth. 
Furthermore, multiculturalism also exists as a policy designed to manage diversity. It 
has allowed for the greater measure of social and political integration as opposed to 
traditional liberal models that de-emphasize cultural difference. 
Multiculturalism does act as a national myth, but also provides a real means of 
mediating cultural differences and potential conflicts. In part the ideology of 
multiculturalism does hold appeal in that it readily address the contemporary demands of 
cultural citizenship. Canada is often described as a "Cultural Mosaic" in direct contrast 
25 John C. Harles, "Integration before Assimilation: Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Canadian 
Polity", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. I-XXX, No.4 (Dec. 1997) p. 734 
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to the American understanding of the "Melting Pot".26 Both refer to processes whereby 
which immigrants acculturate to a new society. More importantly, they also further 
illustrate the differences associated with an understanding of cultural citizenship by 
liberals and communitarians. The United States, like Canada, has its share of national 
myths. The myth traditionally associated with immigration has been that of the search 
for the American Dream. This quest, understood in of terms of economic prosperity and 
the attainment of a social status, is popularly viewed as readily attainable with diligence. 
However, the acceptance of an American value system, or other national myths 
associated with the United States, requires a rejection of previous national or cultural 
loyalties. This assimilationist and homogenizing effect has found a certain degree of 
success throughout American history.27 However, it should be noted that the idea of 
citizenship in America often excluded a cultural component. For instance, African-
Americans, until the 1960's, did not enjoy similar civil rights as did Americans of 
European heritage. However, this condition of systemic discrimination should not be 
assumed to be unique to the United States. Canada has throughout its history abused the 
sovereignty of cultural minorities as well. As in the United States, Canadians of 
Japanese heritage were placed in internment camps during the Second World War; until 
1960 Aboriginal Canadians were denied the right to vote in a federal elections , without 
losing their Indian status.28 While both nations have shared a history marred by such 
blanket abuses of human rights, Canada has in its latter decades developed a more 
26 Fleras and Elliot, p. 59-66 
27 Ibid, p. 62 
28 Rand Dyck, Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches (Toronto: Nelson, 1993) p. 51 
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complex understanding of citizenship in relation to cultural rights. To this end, it has 
subsequently emphasized the merits of cultural diversity. 
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century Canada has pursued a policy 
that has emphasized integration without cultural assimilation The integrationalist model 
allows for the retention of cultural ties, yet allows Canadians to participate fully in the 
social and political institutions. This understanding of Canada is intimately connected to 
issues of managing diversity. Traditionally liberal regimes of citizenship rights are 
adequate in a nineteenth century context in which citizens could trace their ancestry to a 
common cultural heritage. However, the rise in non-European immigration during the 
twentieth century led many Western nations, including Canada to a real adjustment 
regarding conventional attitudes concerning cultural diversity. Canada predated this 
global trend with the adoption, by the Trudeau government, of the original 
Multiculturalism Act in 1971. The government of Brian Mulroney amended the Act in 
1988 to better meet the changing demands of a multicultural and an ever increasingly 
diverse population. Rather than merely funding cultural activities in local communities 
and endorsing a blanket recognition of cultural distinctiveness among Canadians, the 
amendments allowed for a greater focus on managing issues associated with diversity. 
The federal government made a stronger commitment to employment equity, further 
reinforcing cultural diversity as a norm in Canadian society.29 Communitarians would 
find cause to agree with this policy in that they contend that increasingly human diversity 
is perceived as a resource in that it allows for creativity and alternative points of view to 
29 Fleras and Elliott, p. 78 
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emerge. In a rapidly globalizing world, Canada has taken the lead in developing policies 
to address the demands associated with cultural citizenship. Community must be 
understood in a greater context and real attempts must be made to engage in dialogue 
with those who differ socially, economically, and politically. In this respect the 
communitarian tendencies displayed by the Canadian political experience have led 
Canada to be better prepared to address concerns surrounding cultural citizenship rights 
than other traditionally classically liberal nations. While success of the Canadian model 
is based on the assets it had inherited via its unique history, it has not abandoned the 
traditions of liberalism. It has managed to develop as John Ralston Saul terms, 
"minimizing extremes", between the demands of the individual and the common good. 3D 
The notion of addressing differing needs as a means of achieving social stability 
IS a hallmark of the Canadian political system, as John Ralston Saul often cites in 
Reflections ofa Siamese Dream: Canada at the End of the Twentieth Century. For Saul 
"minimizing extremes" allows a society to overcome inequality that comes from an over-
adherence to one particular national perspective?l Canadian scholar Charles Taylor in 
his essay "The Politics of Recognition" extends this understanding, commenting that a 
political culture that prescribes only to liberal principles of justice, is in actuality an 
inherently immoral process. He writes, 
The claim is that the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the 
politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture. As it 
turns out, then, only the minority or suppressed cultures are being forced to 
take alien form. Consequently, the supposed fair and difference-blind society 
30 Saul 505 
31 Saul: p. 507 
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is not only inhuman (because suppressing identities) but also, in a subtle and 
unconscious way, itself highly discriminatory.32 
Taylor furthers his argument by applying it to the Canadian condition. While he 
notes the Charter of Rights and Freedoms itself has adopted an American, thus liberal, 
process of judicial review, the actual understanding of rights in Canadian jurisprudence 
differs from traditional liberal interpretations.33 Saul also supports this opinion, by 
stating, "the Canadian experience has shaped individualism to mean some sort of balance 
between equality of opportunity and equality of results.,,34 Canada's recognition of 
diversity and subsequent distribution of cultural rights are, for Saul and Taylor, more 
pragmatic and socially valid. However, while Saul and Taylor share similar views, a 
philosophical gulf endures between liberal and communitarian perspectives regarding 
cultural citizenship rights. 
32 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", 
Amy Gutmann and Charles Taylor. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p. 43 
33 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 52 
34 Saul, p. 505 
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Chapter Two 
Exploring the Roots of the Communitarian Critique and the Liberal Response 
The Canadian experience indicates that communitarian ideals of justice can take 
hold if the proper political culture exists. However, it also must be connected to 
mechanisms that encourage a deliberative process, coupled with an active policy that 
places value on cultural diversity. Overall, communitarianism suggests liberal theory is 
flawed in that an understanding of the individual exists merely in the context of hislher 
relation to the state. By contrast, communitarians recognize that persons are intimately 
connected to one another. This perception of community also creates an understanding 
that real differences exist at the community level in that people form numerous and 
varied networks of social interaction. Communitarian thought contends that not only 
does a moral obligation exist to recognize their existence, but a legal one as well. With 
this acknowledgment emerges an understanding that the needs of cultural groups differ 
and as a result the distribution of cultural citizenship rights requires multiple 
interpretations. While the communitarian perspective provides a unique and detailed 
critique of traditional liberal theory, liberal scholars themselves have not been silent to 
these philosophical assaults. 
Liberal theorists such as Ronald Dworkin, Robert Dahl, and John Rawls have 
attempted to reinvigorate liberal political theory. They acknowledge that indeed 
liberalism taken in its classical context is dated. Contemporary liberal theory does strive 
to address some of the apparent weaknesses brought forth by communitarian criticisms. 
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Issues such as cultural differentiation and emerging regimes of citizenship rights are 
examined from a new perspective on liberalism. However, communitarians themselves 
have countered with a concerted response of their own. The emergence of this exchange 
between leading theorists from both philosophical schools has allowed for a greater 
understanding of the meanings associated with citizenship rights. The dialogue that has 
emerged from this debate allows for effective discussion as to how justice is defined and 
distributed in a political society. 
Communitarianism is in itself a post-liberal philosophy that attempts to correct 
for the perceived deficiencies associated with liberal political theory.35 Communitarian 
theorists, such as Amitai Etzioni, suggest that the idea of community has been lost or 
virtually ignored within the scope oftraditionalliberalism.36 In response, communitarian 
theory suggests that a greater focus on community must be given in considering key 
philosophical questions. In particular, communitarianism expresses concern as to 
liberalism's responsiveness, in theory and in practice, to meet the particular cultural 
needs associated with contemporary culturally diverse societies. For communitarianism, 
the universality of liberal equality makes it difficult to articulate notions of cultural 
citizenship; justice is defined purely in terms of individual liberty. As a result, a liberal 
conception of justice is perceived as incomplete. By contrast, communitarian thought 
asserts that the expression of internal cultural difference leads to the articulation of 
collective social and political goals. In the quest to develop a collective sense of being, 
35 Markate Daly, Communitarianism: A New Public Ethics (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 1994) p. xiii 
36Amitai Etzioni, ed., Rights and the Common Good: The Communitarian Perspective (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1995) p. 11 
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any recognition of multiple understandings of self should not be viewed as a liability, but 
rather an essential aspect of nation building. To this end, political deliberations resulting 
from the recognition of numerous forms of cultural citizenship allow for the development 
of the common good, and in the end, the creation ofajust community.37 
2.1: Communitarianism In Perspective 
In the promotion of the ideal of community, communitarian theory is often 
misunderstood. Communitarianism is popularly, and erroneously, portrayed as the 
pursuit of an unachievable Utopia. Ironically, while communitarians associate 
themselves with the idea and values associated with community, the concept of 
community is not solely the dominion of communitarian theorists. The notion of 
community has been incorporated into numerous strains of political thought bridging the 
ideological spectrum. It is the primary concept that fuels Marxism and, more recently, 
has been used as focal point by many fundamentalist Christians who advocate a return to 
"traditional family values". However, in regards to communitarianism itself, it is often 
accused of promoting majoritarianism; endorsing the rule of the many at the expense of 
the rights of the individual. Michael Sandel, a leading communitarian scholar, takes 
exception to this interpretation of community. Sandel points out that promoting the 
interests of the community to the detriment the individual is simply and inherently 
undemocratic.38 The communitarian project endeavours to create a greater deliberative 
37 The phrase "Just Community" is a play on words of Pierre E. Trudeau's notion of a "Just Society" 
38 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
pp. ix-x 
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atmosphere among all political actors. However, even on this point, there is some 
disagreement among communitarians as to the proper functioning of communities. 
The basic understanding of community is not constructed upon any formal legal 
understanding of citizenship, but rather a general awareness of a shared common 
experience by a network of associated people. However, the actual dynamics of a 
community is an aspect that is greatly debated within communitarian circles. 
Throughout the body of communitarian literature there are no standard terms used to 
describe the numerous strains of communitarianism that exist in thought or practise, yet 
communitarian theory can be broadly categorized into two specific typologies. Scholars 
such as Michael Sandel and Amitai Etzioni advocate the renewal of neighbourhoods as a 
means of correcting the deficiencies associated with the liberal-democratic project, which 
has been perceived as morally bankrupt. 39 In response they advocate the nurturing of a 
CIVIC culture that emphasizes the common good. This understanding of 
communitarianism is based on the premise that individuals must take it upon themselves 
to maintain public spaces and encourage interest in civic affairs. Social responsibility 
manifests itself locally, rather than initiating from distant elected collective decision-
making bodies. However, it is on this point that there is a lack of consensus among 
communitarian scholars. Rather than reject the means and methods of interest 
articulation associated with modem democratic states, another sub-set of communitarian 
theory asserts that the institutions of liberal-democracy do hold real promise in the 
39 See Michael 1. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press, 1996) and Amitai Etzioni, ed., Rights and the Common Good: The Communitarian 
Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) for more detail 
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renewal of community. This conception, promoted by such scholars as Henry Tam, 
suggests that regardless of difference, a community must be equal and inclusive in all 
formal institutional levels before a fully functional model of democratic government can 
unfold.40 The greater inclusion of a diverse array of social actors encourages the greater 
ability of the community to articulate the interests of the common good, rather than those 
of a privileged few. The democratic initiatives proposed by this understanding of 
communitarianism can be described as loosely liberal. They do not abase the traditional 
institutions associated with liberal-democracy, but rather attempt to invigorate their 
position, influence and effectiveness in a given community. Though both types of 
communitarianism differ in terms of focus, each perspective incorporates an essential and 
shared understanding of community. 
A community in its simplest form is a collection of individual;, however, this 
does not adequately describe the emotional connection between its members and 
associated feelings for others. In order for a community to exist, a sense of fellowship 
and common purpose must exist and be nurtured. This "spirit of togetherness" is the 
fundamental virtue that defines community. Communitarianism has long argued that this 
acknowledgment of "we-ness" has been under emphasized in liberal political theory.41 
Communitarianism holds that while the individual is indeed a crucial actor in any 
democratic society, the connectedness between people cannot be neglected as a 
consequence. For communitarians, a collectivist mentality is based on mutual respect, 
40 Henry Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship (New York: New York 
University Press, 1998) p. 26 
41 Daly, p. xv 
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tolerance and overall concern for others, values that must be cultivated and nurtured. 
Such feelings of a shared common purpose need not merely exist on a local level, but 
they can exist within the context of large-scale and diverse networks of interaction. A 
sense of common purpose can take hold in the consciousness of a nation as likely as it is 
to be found in a neighbourhood. However, it should be noted that the creation of a 
functional civic culture, whether at the local level or at the national scale, requires at its 
core a political culture that illustrates collectivist tendencies. 
The goals and desires embraced by the communitarian project are admirable, 
however even faithful communitarians such as Michael Sandel suggest that the 
actualization of the communitarian ideal may be consigned to exist solely within the 
context of normative thought. Sandel suggests in Democracy's Discontent that the 
weaknesses associated with liberalism are clear, even among liberal political 
philosophers. Liberalism has constructed a regime of citizenship rights based on the tired 
premise of individual liberty.42 While in the process liberalism does minimize the role 
community plays, Michael Sandel concedes that liberalism is a ubiquitous force asserting 
an apparently limitless influence throughout scope of America's democratic institutions. 
The political attitudes, expectations and aspirations of American citizens are inspired by 
a republican political culture that is spawned by Jeffersonian values. Sandel acquiesces 
in the knowledge that this spirit humbles any real and significant attempt to cultivate a 
42 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press, 1996) p. 323 
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sense of community.43 Overall, Michael Sandel suggests that the idea of community can 
be of value, as evidenced by such undertakings as New Urbanism and "Sprawlbusters".44 
However, overall he suggests that the idea of community and a collectivist-oriented civic 
culture cannot be fully expected to supersede an American political culture based so 
thoroughly upon individualliberty.45 
The arguments Sandel puts forth in Democracy's Discontent are convincing even 
though they disappoint his communitarian aspirations. However, the work as a whole 
can be viewed as limited in scope in that Sandel's communitarian vision focuses almost 
exclusively on an apparently stagnant American political culture. The philosophical 
points Sandel does make are valid, however it should not be understood that 
communitarianism is a wholly Americanized political philosophy. The hindrances 
associated with American political culture may not necessarily encumber the 
development of a formative communitarian project elsewhere. The nurturing of civic 
virtue requires an already existing collectivist political culture, a condition in which 
citizenship rights are not fully based upon individualism. While Michael Sandel may 
present his communitarian project in an American context, the political model that better 
meets the requirements set forth by communitarians may be found in the Canadian 
political experience. Canadian political culture meets the criteria set forth by Sandel and 
other communitarian theorists. As scholars such as Taylor, Saul and Lipset have 
indicated, it displays collectivist tendencies, formally recognizes different understandings 
43 Ibid, p. 317 . 
44 Ibid, pp. 334-35 
45 Ibid, pp. 317-51 
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of citizenship, and possesses a complex deliberative component. These three elements 
set Canada apart from a liberal understanding of government and rights discourse, one 
that is based primarily on individualism and a universal interpretation of justice. 
. While numerous theorists have pointed to liberalism's flaws, liberalism has a 
regenerative quality to its character. Throughout the centuries is had adapted to various 
shifts in the social, economic and political order. Early notions of radical individualism, 
associated with classical liberalism, has given way to welfare liberalism, a system of 
governance adopted by many Western nations throughout the twentieth century. As a 
whole, welfare liberalism expands the role of the state in not only the distribution of 
social goods, but also ensures the equal distribution of those goods. While themes of 
liberal social justice have been adopted by many liberal-democracies, numerous 
weaknesses have been attributed to this particular mode. While a depth of literature has 
emerged examining liberalism's presumed failings, liberal theorists have not been silent 
to these commentaries; a revival has occurred in the sphere of contemporary liberal 
political thought. Liberalism, in an attempt to renew itself, has endeavoured to expand 
upon its traditional philosophical boundaries. 
The deficiencies associated with liberal political thought have been made 
apparent through the emergence and development of recent critiques regarding liberal 
conceptions of justice. Communitarianism has pointed to the neglect of community and 
cultural diversity within the context of traditional liberal political theory. Liberal 
theorists have attempted to address this point through the incorporation of a broader 
understanding of pluralism, while at the same time sustaining the precept of individual 
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liberty. This is illustrated in Robert Dahl's Democracy, Liberty, and Equality, which 
attempts to position social pluralism in the context of liberal political theory. 
2.2: The "New" Liberalism 
Dahl proposes that a discussion of pluralism, cultural or otherwise, is indeed 
necessary in that the modern conception of democracy is not based upon the relatively 
homogenous city-states of antiquity, but rather is realized in large and diverse nations.46 
Considering the nature of democratic states, it must also be recognized that a collection 
of diverse social actors is instrumental to the success of any democratic state; without 
their participation and numerous inputs, democracy is devoid of a capacity for 
improvement.47 The acknowledgment that the interests and participation of a variety of 
social actors is a necessary and important recognition, while legitimate, is a limited 
understanding. While a recognition of pluralism is welcome, it ignores the capacity of a 
community to develop a definition of justice through independent means. For Dahl, the 
social diversity found in a community can only function adequately through the equal 
participation within the traditional institutions of democracy. He writes, 
According to this criterion (effective participation), throughout the process of 
making binding decisions, one must have an adequate opportunity, and equal 
opportunity, for expressing his or her preferences as to the final outcome. Thus 
citizens must have adequate and equal opportunity for placing questions on the 
agenda, and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than 
another ... And if some citizens have less opportunity than others, then their 
preferences as to the final outcome are less likely to be taken into account .48 
46 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy, Liberty and Equality (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986) p. 227 
47 Dahl, p. 228 
48 Dahl, pp. 196-97 
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The incorporation of diversity, for Dahl, is realized by creating a higher degree of 
participation in the larger democratic process; the greater participation, the greater 
diversity of opinion that is considered in determining the overall political agenda. 
However, Dahl's understanding of liberalism adheres to the traditional liberal ideal of a 
universally applicable regime of citizenship rights. Communitarian theory would suggest 
that Dahl merely reinforces existing liberal principles. While Dahl's attempt to renew 
liberal thought is admirable, it falls well short of recognizing the dynamic that 
community plays in the larger scope of the democratic tradition. 
Communitarians have asserted that a differentiation of rights, and a real 
acknowledgment of community, are key aspects of the contemporary condition. 
However, in responding to such criticisms, liberals have also pointed to several 
weaknesses associated with a communitarian understanding of justice. What has emerged 
from this exchange has been termed "The Liberal-Communitarian Debate" and has 
allowed for several pointed issues of contention to emerge from both schools of 
thought.49 In particular, Ronald Dworkin has found cause to subject communitarianism 
to further scrutiny. 
Ronald Dworkin suggests that a communitarian vision of the good life is indeed 
coveted by the majority of scholars, both liberal and communitarian. The notion of a 
plural, yet harmonious society in which all particular social, economic, political, and 
cultural needs are met, is an ideal conception of justice. However, Dworkin insists that 
49 The phrase "Liberal- Communitarian Debate" is taken from Charles Taylor, "Cross Purposes: The 
Liberal- Communitarian Debate" in Liberalism and the Moral Life, Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1989) p. 163 ' 
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this is an overly simplistic means of understanding the intricacies of human relations; 
communitarians may articulate a conception of justice, however fail in the attempt to 
describe its proposed means offunctioning.50 
In any socially diverse community, differentiated ideals of justice hold the 
capacity to create tension and conflict, and in the process, further marginalize social 
groups.51 Dworkin suggests that while a society may endorse differentiated citizenship 
rights as a means of creating a condition of social equality, there is no agreement upon 
the limits of such rights.52 The example of affirmative action in the United States is 
indicative of this dichotomy. While many do acknowledge that racism and systemic 
discrimination are social issues that must be addressed by the polity, there is no 
agreement as to what extent marginalized cultural minorities should be guaranteed 
employment through affirmative action. In essence, Dworkin's contention is that justice 
cannot be measured when rights are differentiated. Furthermore, even if the recognition 
and response to the needs of marginalized social groups may seem reasonable, it may 
also detract from the rights of other actors involved in the process. The overall issue that 
Dworkin exposes is that a communitarian ideal of justice is appealing in an abstract form, 
however is muddled in that no appropriate limits are provided in the extension of 
differentiated citizenship rights. 53 Through his analysis, Dworkin defends the principle of 
50 Ronald Dworkin and Michael Walzer, "To Each His Own: An Exchange on Spheres of Justice" in 
Communitarianism: A New Public Ethics, Markate Daly, ed. (Belmount: Wadsworth, 1994) p. 111 
51 Ibid, p. 111 
52 Ibid, p. 112 
53 Ibid, p. 114 
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universal ethics that has traditionally been associated with liberalism in that it sets clear 
and firm boundaries for the dissemination of citizenship rights. 
Dworkin directs his criticisms of communitarianism primarily against Michael 
Walzer's notion of "Complex Equality" as outlined in Separate Spheres. For Dworkian an 
apparent theoretical dichotomy emerges from ideals espoused by communitarians and in 
the perspectives supported by such scholars as Michael Walzer and David Miller. 
However, Miller suggests that the principle of universality is over simplified. Miller, 
expanding on the work of Michael Walzer, suggests that the liberal theoretical formula is 
difficult to apply in terms addressing the welfare of the public. The distribution of justice 
should not assume that in the distribution of social goods, such as citizenship rights, all 
actors have similar needs and requirements. 54 Walzer himself proposes that justice 
cannot be considered in an aggregate form, rather its components must be considered 
separately. As a result, Walzer forwards a notion of "Complex Equality" which allows 
different communities, using their own standards, to decide how a good is to be justly 
distributed among its members.55 He writes in Separate Spheres, 
"The questions posed by distributive justice admit of a range of answers, and 
there is room within the range for cultural diversity and political choice ... the 
principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that different social 
goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different 
understandings of the social goods themselves-the inevitable product of 
historical and cultural particularism. ,,56 
54 David Miller, "Complex Equality" in Pluralism, Justice and Equality, David Miller and Michael Walzer, 
eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 287 
55 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983) p. 5 
56 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 6 
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Walzer's understanding of justice, "Complex Equality", allows for a society to 
distribute social goods disproportionately in so far as they are applied justly according to 
the particular cultural needs of each community. This position is also supported by John 
Ralston Saul. In commenting on this notion, Saul indicates that cultural citizenship is 
more than just an abstract quality but rather a social good that can be distributed through 
institutional mechanisms. He writes, 
"As for real equality, it consists of a constant balancing act - one which the 
federation carries out through the participation of both the national and 
provincial governments. That act is centred on the redistribution of money 
and services. And those services have as much to do with culture as they do 
with our physical well-being. It was our commitment to this sort of equality 
which lay at the centre of Canada's evolution"S7 
Saul's analysis indicates that cultural citizenship rights have a real social value 
amongst diverse political actors. Nations differ in history, religious and cultural 
composition and as a result it should not be expected that a universal standard of justice 
be equally applicable to all citizens. However, Walzer, in defending this thesis, suggests 
that the very boundaries set by a liberal conception of justice, suffocates the notion of 
democratic citizenship. According to Dworkin, rights are guaranteed and protected 
through the traditional difference-blind institutions of liberal-democracy, however this 
idea, as Walzer suggests, in inherently undemocratic.58 It removes the ability of citizens 
to self-define what is in their best interests, who they see themselves as in relation to a 
larger social context. In the process, this allows only government, legislatures and the 
57 Saul, p. 506 
58 Ibid, p. 115 
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judiciary to define individual and group identity. 59 The danger in engaging in such a 
process is that corrupted democratic institutions may develop perverted interpretations of 
citizenship. This is clearly evident through such historical examples as slavery which, 
through the active participation of government and the judiciary, the lesser moral worth 
of African-Americans was legally emphasized. By contrast, for communitarians one's 
own density must be a choice and a product of one's self identity and connection to the 
others. Walzer suggests that liberalism should not overlook that consideration must be 
given to the idea of community in the development of a more complete understanding of 
justice, an aspect that Saul includes in his work. In the process, community diversity 
must be respected, openly acknowledged and actively encouraged.60 
2.3: Rawlsian Liberalism 
The Dworkin-Walzer example illustrates the extremities associated with the 
"Liberal-Communitarian Debate". It is fully representative of other concerted attempts to 
define citizenship and construct a contemporary, thus relevant, theory of justice. John 
Rawls, differing from Walzer and Dworkin, attempts to create the broader theoretical 
foundation where upon which a definition of justice can be created. In the process, 
Rawls acknowledges that social difference must be accounted for and this can be 
accomplished within the context of liberal theory. Rawls contends in A Theory of 
Justice that liberalism in actuality must acknowledge difference in the attempt to form of 
a complete conception of justice. Rawls purposes through a heuristic device, the "Veil of 
Ignorance", that a diverse collection of social actors can develop a common definition of 
59 Ibid, p. 115 
60 Ibid, p. 117 
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justice through a deliberative process. In order to produce the desired effect, Rawls 
suggests that participants not be made aware of such particulars as hislher own social 
status, race, religion, gender, age, etc. Rawls continues by explaining, 
As far as possible, the only particular facts which parties know is that their 
society is subject to the circumstances of justice and whatever this implies. It 
is taken for granted, however, that they know the general facts about human 
society. They understand political affairs and the principles of economic 
theory; they know the basis of social organization and the laws of human 
psychology. Indeed, the parties are presumed to know whatever general facts 
affect the choice of the principles of justice. There arena limitations on general 
information, that is, on general laws and theories, since conceptions of justice 
must be adjusted to the characteristic of the systems of social cooperation 
which they are to regulate. 61 
The intention of including only relevant information ensures, according to Rawls, 
for a functional theory of justice to emerge in that no person will attempt to create a 
conception of justice the may advantage himlherself, and in the process, disadvantage 
another certain person or group. Since all are ignorant of social status, no one person 
will risk potentially hindering him/herself by allowing any measure of social 
dominance.62 The model Rawls develops allows for a real recognition of social diversity 
and group difference in the formation of liberal theory of justice. Overall, Rawlsian 
justice is developed through an understanding of the rationality of the participants 
involved. A true understanding of justice can emerge from the "Veil of Ignorance", 
according to Rawls, in that the parties involved are representative of society as a whole; 
participants are not prejudiced by irrelevant information that may impair any open and 
honest deliberations. 
61 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1971) pp. 137-38 
62 Ibid, p. 137 
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John Rawls' proposal for the development of justice is, according to liberal 
standards, progressive. It allows for a development of a definition of justice that 
encapsulates an understanding of diversity and addresses the diverse needs of social 
actors. However several difficulties with Rawls' model have emerged; communitarian 
theory points to several inconsistencies with the "Veil of Ignorance". Curiously enough 
the model that Rawls suggests does not fully and completely offend communitarians. 
The deliberative nature of the "Veil ofIgnorance" corresponds to a communitarian desire 
for the renewal of political deliberation. Furthennore the deliberative process that Rawls 
suggests, absent from Dahl's and Dworkin's respective conceptions of justice, is inclusive 
in that it gives consideration to social diversity, including presumably cultural difference. 
However fault is found in the development of Rawls' argumentative logic. Rawls 
suggests that the "Veil of Ignorance" is a hypothetical condition in which all actors are 
aware of "the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology ... (and) the 
characteristic of the systems of social cooperation ... ,,63 It is evident that Rawls does 
make provisions for the allowance of infonnation concerning group-oriented behaviour 
and identity. However, Rawls assumes that the final product would reject any of the 
collectivist/deliberative tendencies associated with the development of a theory of 
justice. It is excluded, without reasonable cause, that justice in the end will be 
conceived through an understanding of the individual as the primary social and political 
unit. While a sense of common purpose is clearly evident throughout Rawls' description 
63 Ibid, p. 137 
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of the deliberative process associated with the "Veil of Ignorance", it disappears in the 
final analysis. 
Rawls' use of a hypothetical model allows for an understanding of justice that is 
free from social domination. While Rawls explicitly denies rational parties any 
information that may sway them to arrive upon a prejudiced theory of justice, the 
potential application Rawlsian justice is open to the very prejudices that Rawls' attempts 
to avoid. Once the "Veil of Ignorance" is lifted the harsh reality is that even an 
untainted and complete theory of justice, one that was agreed upon by all parties, may 
merely be ignored in the pursuit of self-interested goals. Amy Gutmann suggests that 
even understood generously, this type of liberalism fails to make a substantive 
transformation in the understanding of justice, in particular equality. She writes in 
Liberal Equality, 
True to the liberal belief in human equality, a just political order would 
cultivate the potential for cooperation among people while protecting their 
individuality from unjustified social intrusions. Thus moral transformation is 
expected to follow from the institutionalization of a just political order - for 
only with that creation can people securely contribute to mutual cooperative 
enterprise ... But liberal theory does not presuppose a radical moral 
transformation ... rather, liberal egalitarianism looks forward to a 
development...of the liberal welfare state. Even liberal's most radical 
expectation - that the most advantaged will willing and in a fraternal spirit 
contribute to the interests of the least advantaged - does not require a complete 
remaking of moral consciousness.64 
Gutmann, in criticizing Rawls, forwards her own conception of justice, which 
recognizes social diversity as a real, not merely convenient theoretical condition. 
Gutmann differs from Rawls in that an element of social cooperation is included in not 
64 Amy Gutmann, Liberal Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) p. 229 
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only the formation of a theory of justice, but in its actual application as well. However, 
Gutmann is not alone is her critique of Rawlsian liberalism. Gutmann's reaction to Rawls 
is evidenced in the criticisms of other scholars as well. 
The idealized notion of cooperation supported by Rawlsian liberalism is overly 
abstract for certain scholars. According to Robert Paul Wolff several large questions 
remain regarding social organization. Wolff writes, "When one reflects that A Theory of 
Justice is, before all else, an argument for substantial redistributions of income and 
wealth, it is astonishing that Rawls pays so little attention to the institutional 
arrangements by means of which redistribution is to be carried out,,65 This point is 
addressed by Brian Berry as well, in the examination of the possible emergence of just 
constitutions from the formative project Rawls has suggested. Berry concludes that for 
Rawls a society is nearly in agreement as to a common understanding of justice, or "it is 
a jungle", in which social differences translate in political and social disorder.66 For 
Rawls it is inconceivable that a society undergo a process of moral self-examination, yet 
continue to exude some measure of political stability.67 For Rawls the key aspect absent 
from his perspective is a mechanism for creating balance between competing social 
interests, a feature that John Ralston Saul and Michael Walzer discuss in their respective 
positions. It appears that John Rawls, in developing his liberal theory of justice, faces the 
opposite problem that Robert Dahl and Ronald Dworkin do. While the latter scholars rely 
65 Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Rawls (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977) p. 202 
66 Brian Berry, The Liberal Theory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1973) p. 152 
67 Ibid, p. 252-53 
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too heavily upon liberal-democratic institutions in building their respective theories of 
justice, Rawls does not apply them to the context of his own understanding of justice. 
It is evident that even among competing liberal definitions of justice, certain 
weaknesses emerge. These uncertainties are further exposed through a communitarian 
critique provided by Michael Sandel in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Writing in 
the communitarian tradition, Sandel suggests Rawls' understanding of justice is skewed 
in that is presupposes that people must orient themselves to one particular conception of 
justice. While Rawls, Gutmann, and Sandel do agree that pluralism is a social reality and 
must be acknowledged, Sandel suggests liberal understandings fail because "for a 
society inspired by the liberal promise, the problem is not simply that justice remains 
always to be achieved, but that the vision is flawed, the aspiration incomplete. ,,68 
Communitarians have traditionally been at odds with liberal conceptions of the moral 
life, a point Sandel finds in Rawls' understanding of justice. He finds it limited in that it 
is morally neutral; it does not promote any specific notion or ideal as to what is to be 
considered good or just. Sandel contends that for Rawls it seems the process of 
deliberation is an end in itself. 69 This for many communitarian scholars, including 
Sandel, is a dangerous theoretical vacuum; liberalism blindly adheres to individualism 
while remaining disengaged as to an individual's place and function in society. Without a 
specific moral articulation of the presumed ends of any theory of justice, liberal or 
otherwise, it is incomplete and open to false unethical interpretation. 
68 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 1 
69 Ibid, p. 183 
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Sandel does acknowledge that a theory of justice to some extent must recognize 
individualism, however it must also recognize that individuals are social creatures as 
well. Sandel writes, 
... we form relationships and engage in co-operative arrangements with others. 
The point is not that persons co-operate out of selfish motives alone, but rather 
that our knowledge of the basis of plurality is given prior to experience, while 
our knowledge of the basis of unity or cooperation can only come in light of 
experience.7o 
For Sandel, a theory of justice must be grounded in the idea of community. We 
form networks of association as evidenced by political parties, interests groups, labour 
unions, neighbourhood associations or simply the existence of towns and cities.7! The 
social structures associated with human existence and survival must be incorporated in 
any conception of justice. Overall, Sandel contends that a theory of justice must be 
understood through a more complex means that merely individual liberty. 
It is obvious that questions arise from Rawls' theory of justice. However, Rawls 
himself has not remained silent to these aforementioned criticisms. As a result, Rawls 
attempts to address these numerous critiques regarding his particular interpretation of 
justice and equality through Political Liberalism. Rawls' ensuing work seeks to take the 
ideal of justice from a purely theoretical context and place it a real social context. The 
premise upon which this is accomplished is the idea of public reason, understood as the 
moral and intellectual capacity of a society to constructively and reasonably deliberate 
upon a conception of justice and citizenship. He writes of the ideal of public reason, 
70 Ibid, p. 53 
71 Ibid, p. 149 
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.. public reason should be so understood and honoured by citizens, of course, a 
matter of law. As an ideal conception of citizenship for a constitutional 
democratic regime, it presents how things might be, taking people as a just and 
well ordered society would encourages them to be. It describes what is 
possible and can be, yet may never be, though no less fundamental for that,,72 
While earlier communitarian critiques of A Theory of Justice point out that Rawls 
does not address the role of the state in his conception of the just society, he attempts to 
redress this concern through the structured framework of constitutional democracy. 
Rawls further responds to prior communitarian commentaries in that he acknowledges 
that "equal citizens, as a collective body" hold supreme power in any democratic state.73 
However, the understanding of "collective body" is qualified in that it is only considered 
within the context of traditional liberal-democratic institutions, such as political parties or 
elected legislatures. In Rawls' understanding of the democratic process, public reason 
excludes "associations of kinds: churches and universities, scientific societies and 
professional groups. ,,74 Rawls justification for this exclusion is based upon the notion 
that they belong to "background" culture and are not collectively shared by the public. 
Nonpublic reasoning organizations, as Rawls terms them, attempt to satisfy their own 
respective concerns first, rather than society at large.75 While there is an element of 
accuracy to this point, public and non-public reasoning should not be considered 
mutually exclusive. Rather they exist within similar social parameters in that participants 
claim membership in numerous overlapping organizations and/or groups. Rawls fails to 
72 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) p. 213 
73 Ibid, p. 214 
74 Ibid, p. 220 
75 Ibid, p. 220 
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acknowledge that the deliberation of non-public reasoning can prove a valuable asset in 
the process of public reason in that various conceptions of justice and the good life are 
brought forth and evaluated in a larger public context. Rawls' acknowledgment of social 
diversity plays a limited role in the development of a conception of the good life. 
Rawls does not neglect the fact that differentiated conceptions of justice may 
exist within any given society. He allows for such a contingency in Political Liberalism 
and suggests an appropriate response. He writes, 
It is inevitable and often desirable that citizens have different views as to the 
most appropriate political conception; for the public political culture is bound 
to contain different fundamental ideas that can be developed in different ways. 
An orderly contest between them over time is a reliable way to find which 
one, if any, is most reasonable,,76 
While non-public and public reason are separate concepts, public reason itself is 
exclusionary. Rawls asserts that only reasonable people be considered in the deliberative 
process associated with public reason. However, what is understood as "reasonable" is 
ambiguous at best. The diverse social representation found in the "Veil of Ignorance" 
does not exist in Rawls'understanding of public reason. It potentially excludes those 
social groups and individual actors that do not share an understanding of justice that is 
pursued through a constitutional framework. The issue of reasonableness is not merely a 
minor theoretical point, but rather it exists as a real issue of contention. The example of 
First Nations peoples illustrates this point. 
Liberal-democracy is a product of European political culture and for many 
Aboriginal Canadians articulates a foreign conception of justice; it is often regarded as a 
76 Ibid, p. 227 
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mode of cultural imperialism. Throughout the centuries it has been the very the 
institutions and traditions associated with liberal-democracy that have oppressed 
Canada's First Nations. While Rawls represents a new understanding liberalism, it cannot 
be ignored that Aboriginals may not fully share the cultural values of Europeans and as a 
result mistrust the liberal-democratic institutions.77 Should it then be considered that 
their reluctance to accept constitutional liberal-democracy be considered unreasonable? 
While Rawls understanding of reasonableness may be exclusionary in certain respects, 
the point has not been lost in Canada. The Canadian justice system has accommodated 
some Aboriginal communities by encouraging a return to traditional cultural means for 
conflict resolution, coupled with the contemporary measures of Canada's justice 
system.78 Communitarian ideals would point out that justice need not be carried out 
solely through a uniform liberal-democratic framework in order to fairly distribute 
justice. 
The issue of cultural accommodation is a key criticism of Political Liberalism, in 
that Rawls apparently repeats earlier errors outlined in A Theory of Justice. While the 
traditional liberal understandings of universally applicable codes of justice appear in the 
final framework of Rawls' practical reason, it ignores the significant role that cultural 
diversity plays in modem democratic states. The primary flaw exhibited in Rawls' work 
is the failure to develop a mechanism through which competing cultural norms and 
conceptions of justice can be fairly deliberated upon. To the contrary, Rawls explicitly 
77 Margaret Moore, "Political Liberalism and Cultural Diversity" in Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence Vol. VIII, No.2 (July 1995), pp. 306-7 
78 John A. Olthuis and Roger Townshend, "The Case for Native Sovereignty" in Contemporary Political 
Issues, Mark Charlton and Paul Barker, eds. (Toronto: Nelson, 1994) p. 67 
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denies those perspectives outside traditional constitutional frameworks of public reason 
an opportunity to engage in a deliberative process. Margaret Moore maintains that an 
understanding of citizenship for Rawls is conceived as national in character, while 
cultural identity is confined to the domain of the private/personal sphere. Moore contends 
that cultural identity is inherently connected to citizenship; governments and legislators 
cannot be neutral to this obvious point. 79 Moore suggests that "in practice, almost all 
liberal states have a dominant culture and value system ... France creates Frenchmen: it 
teaches French history and traditions, the French language; the United Kingdom teaches 
British history, the English language and so on."80 This relationship between nation and 
culture has become increasingly intricate in an era of post-modernity. More and more 
cultural minorities articulate their interests on a national scale; the personal has indeed 
become political. The agenda of First Nations people, for instance, is not merely 
cultural, but incorporates a political and socio-economic dimension. The formation of 
the Parti Quebecois, and later the Bloc Quebecois, are illustrations that issues pertaining 
to cultural identity, though personal, have become public and an integral part of the 
larger liberal-democratic framework. Communitarians argue that citizens and their 
respective governments cannot remain morally disengaged and ignore the needs of 
potentially marginalized component groups of society. An active and conscious effort 
must be made to give voice to those who may be culturally threatened by the majority. 
Fred Dallmayr writes of the Canadian condition with respect to the French culture, 
79 Moore, p. 308 
80 Ibid, p. 308 
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... political society cannot remain 'neutral' between those seeking to maintain 
cultural traditions and those wish to 'cut loose' to promote individual self-
interest...what (is) at issue in constitutional debates (is) not only an individual 
right to bilingualism but the survival and flourishing of French culture is seen 
as a shared 'good' and its preservative for both present and future generations,,81 
Dallmayr illustrates that justice and equality need not be defined solely in terms 
of individual language rights alone, rather the protection of minority cultures through 
institutions ensures the success of society as a whole. Government and citizens must 
remain consistently proactive in the ever-evolving discourse regarding cultural 
citizenship rights. The model Rawls provides regarding public reason is theoretically 
weak, as evidenced by the contemporary political environment; it does not wholly reflect 
the Canadian condition as illustrated by Dallmayr. Margaret Moore also extends this 
argument by writing of Rawls' perspective, 
" .. Rawls minimizes the amount of diversity, and, second, that a quite different 
solution to political stability would be required in a truly diverse state. If we 
are to continue with Rawl's quest to establish legitimate principles to regulate 
relations in culturally diverse societies, and which will provide a basis for 
democracy and political stability, then, the privatization of culture is not an 
adequate solution. We must look beyond a narrow agreement on a few thin 
principles to see if there cannot be different kinds of political arrangement, 
consistent with recognizing cultural identities, which are acceptable from the 
liberal standpoint ... 82 
While the criticisms levelled against Rawls have emerged from both 
communitarian and liberal scholars alike, Moore suggests that the liberal project does not 
necessarily end with Rawls. In fact Moore does not reject liberalism in its entirety; she 
81 Fred Dallmayr, "Democracy and Multiculturalism" in Democracy and Difference, Seyla Benhabib, ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) p. 287 
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strongly suggests a more appropriate liberal perspective is needed. s3 Will Kymlicka, 
through an extensive body of work, has examined the rights of cultural minorities from a 
liberal perspective. Furthermore, the Canadian example is often used as the theoretical 
foundation throughout his scholarly enterprises. The Kyrnlickan understanding of rights 
discourse, with specific regard given to cultural citizenship in Canada, warrants a 
detailed examination. 
83 Ibid, pp. 309-10 
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Chapter Three 
What is Defined as Cultural Citizenship in Canada? 
While John Rawls, Robert Dahl and Ronald Dworkin have incorporated a limited 
understanding of pluralism into their respective theoretical models, Kymlicka constructs 
a more thorough understanding of contemporary cultural citizenship. Will Kymlicka's 
interpretation of rights discourse is important in that it attempts to rise above the 
"Liberal-Communitarian Debate", while supporting the perspective of others scholars 
that have written of the Canadian condition, such as Charles Taylor and John Ralston 
Saul. 
Though no definite or formal criteria exists, Will Kymlicka suggests in "Three 
Forms of Group-Differentiated Citizenship in Canada", that cultural pluralism can be 
subdivided in to two parts. Firstly, there is the condition of the "multination" state, which 
includes such groups as the English, French and Aboriginals.84 This definition is 
grounded in the sharing of an historical presence in Canada and can be defined along 
specific geographic lines. Until recently, "multination" excluded Aboriginal Canadians, 
in that Canada was viewed as bicultural, composed only of English and French 
communities. However, with the advent of official multiculturalism and through such 
constitutional initiatives as the Charlottetown Accord, the general public view has 
84 Will Kymlicka, "Three Forms of Group-Differentiated Citizenships in Canada" in Democracy and 
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Seyla Benhabib, ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996) pp. 153-4 
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allowed for recognition of Aboriginal Canadians as a founding people as well. 85 Though 
Kymlicka accords Aboriginals status as a "multination", certain qualities exist that 
differentiate it from English and French communities within Canada. While Canada's 
First Nations are culturally dissimilar, they have endured similar shared experiences of 
colonization and exploitation. 
Will Kymlicka follows his description of "multination" by introducing the 
concept of a "polyethnic" society. Though both based along ethnic lines, the polyethnic 
organization of Canadian society is based upon immigration and the great amount of 
diversity it has created. Canadians included in this group do not have a geographically 
defined territory such as those of Aboriginal, French and English heritage. Polyethnic 
communities only exist as an entity in that Canada has committed itself to protecting its 
cultural assets, both on a multination and polyethnic level, through an official policy of 
multiculturalism.86 Though immigrants often acculturate within the larger Anglophone 
or Francophone communities, they often exist as sub-cultures and thus can be culturally 
identified. However the prime distinction between the two is that "multinations" are 
officially recognized as groups on an institutional level, while polyethnic citizens are 
protected through their rights as individuals to practice their respective customs and 
traditions in private, without much legal regard for group identification.87 Kymlicka 
identifies what seems to be a tacit social consensus within Canada in that there is a 
general public view that citizenship guarantees can be secured through cultural rights for 
85 Ibid, p. 154 
86 Kymlicka, "Three Forms of Group-Differentiated Citizenship in Canada", pp. 154-55 
87 Ibid, p. 155 
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individuals and groups, a View also shared by John Ralston Saul. The liberal 
understanding of cultural citizenship rights that Kymlicka provides dramatically departs 
from a Rawlsian understanding of liberalism and extends the boundaries to its theoretical 
limits. While Kymlicka follows in a liberal philosophical tradition, his construction of a 
definition of justice shows striking similarity to the understanding of justice proposed by 
scholars such as Taylor and Saul. Kymlicka, through a focus on the Canadian condition, 
attempts to bridge the gap between both liberal and communitarian perspectives, 
illustrating a balance between both theoretical perspectives. 
3.1 The Kymlickan Hybrid Model 
In the attempt to narrow the divide between liberalism and communitarianism, 
Will Kymlicka extends his argument in Liberalism, Community, and Culture. As a 
whole the work examines the premises upon which both philosophical doctrines build 
their respective theories of justice. In particular, Kymlicka suggests that there need not 
be a direct conflict between notions of individuality and community. A recognition of 
cultural membership allows for individuals to be part of a moral narrative that allows 
people to examine their choices and make intelligent decisions.88 Overall, the argument 
Will Kymlicka puts forth is that it is only through an examination of society as a whole 
that citizenship can be defined. However, what further sets Kymlicka's analysis apart 
from pure communitarian theorists, such as Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer, is that 
Kymlicka also finds communitarian assertions regarding the self and community flawed 
to some extent. 
88 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 137 
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Communitarians have generally argued that liberalism is biased toward furthering 
the interests of the individual at the expense of the community. However, Kymlicka 
implies that communitarians, in promoting their particular conception of justice, assume 
that a shared sense of togetherness leads directly to the emergence a common conception 
of justice. This comment resembles Dworkin's criticism of Walzer, however Kymlicka 
furthers the argument. Cultural diversity holds the potential for social conflict in that it 
encourages multiple and competing conceptions of justice. Even amongst those who 
share a common cultural identity, the possibility for disunity exists. Ironically, while 
communitarians have found reason to criticize Rawls and the deliberative process 
associated with the "Veil ofIgnorance", traditional communitarian theory has not devised 
a functional mechanism of its own to promote any sense of togetherness. While the 
notion of a civic culture and deliberative democracy are touted by communitarians as a 
mechanism for conflict resolution, it does not provide actual detail as to how different 
conceptions of justice are to be deliberated upon. This causes difficulties in not only the 
articulation of a communitarian understanding of justice, but also its implementation. 
For instance, while government may respect and protect the rights of a given cultural 
group, it must also be acknowledged that members of a specific cultural group may have 
varied conceptions of the good life. They may disagree amongst themselves as to the 
appropriate means through which government can protect their particular interpretation 
of what constitutes a cultural right.89 To complicate matters, even if a cultural group may 
agree upon a common understanding of justice, this may violate the norms of the society 
89 Ibid, p. 239 
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as a whole. For instance, a particular cultural group may only allow men to participate in 
the internal decision making processes, thereby subjugating women, an obvious rejection 
of the spirit of gender equality found in many contemporary liberal-democratic states. 
Kymlicka clearly illustrates that both the communitarian and liberal understandings of 
justice have developed weaknesses, yet he does not depart from either project. In 
response, Kymlicka develops an understanding of cultural citizenship that narrows to a 
finite degree the actual theoretical differences and conflicts associated with 
communitarian and liberal political theory. 
The liberal and communitarian perspectives regarding the discourse concerning 
the distribution of cultural citizenship rights is often portrayed as divisive. However 
Kymlicka, through an assessment of the respective weaknesses associated with both 
philosophical doctrines, has found some theoretical common ground. He provides a 
nuanced examination of minority rights in liberal-democratic societies in Multicultural 
Citizenship. For Kymlicka, a liberal, the primary issue of importance concerns the 
acknowledgment of cultural diversity within modern liberal-democratic states. In 
addition to this, an emphasis is placed on the requirement to recogmze cultural 
citizenship in the creation of a just society. However, the key issue that remains 
questionable is the means through which both a common conception of justice can 
coexist with particular cultural identities that require differentiated citizenship rights.9o 
Kymlicka suggests that a set of shared values must exist that are respected by all social 
actors, regardless of particular identity. While a conception of justice may not be held in 
90 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) p. 108 
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common, Kymlicka suggests shared political values must be present in order that a social 
dialogue may take place.91 Kymlicka writes of the Canadian condition, 
For example, one government commission in Canada developed a list of seven 
such values Canadians shared: (1) a belief in equality and fairness; (2) a belief 
in consultation and dialogue; (3) the importance of accommodation and 
tolerance; (4) support for diversity; (5) compassion and generosity; (6) 
attachment to the natural environment; (7) a commitment to freedom, peace 
and non-violent change. The hope is that focusing on these shared values will 
provide grounds for unity in Canada.92 
Kyrnlicka's description of common political values that allow for a well-ordered 
political society read suspiciously similar to a Saulian understanding of Canadian 
political culture. This notion is furthered through his assertion that a set of shared values 
does not necessarily allow for the creation of political community. The missing element 
from many liberal conceptions of justice, as Kymlicka suggests, is the need for a shared 
identity among a polity.93 
Kymlicka points out that a shared identity often exists even in the absence of 
shared values and social diversity, as evidenced by American political culture.94 
However, this is indeed the challenge modem liberal-democracies must face; in an ever 
increasing socially diverse society, shared values and identity can not be easily 
cultivated. Kymlicka points to Charles Taylor's understanding of deep diversity as a 
means of building ajust community. It not only recognizes the multi-ethnic compositions 
91 Ibid, p. 187 
92 Ibid, p. 187 
93 Ibid, pp. 190-91 
94 Ibid, pp. 189-90 
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of states, but also reinforces their role within the scope of society as a whole.95 The task 
for liberals is unique in that while Kymlicka outlines the scope of a theory of justice, 
through an understanding of liberal-democratic institutions, he also acknowledges that 
cultural citizenship rights must be differentiated. While Kymlicka does suggest shared 
values and identity as starting points for an element of social cohesion, he does not 
expand upon how these factors are to be developed. He suggests that they are connected 
to such tangible cultural products as language, history and religion.96 In making this 
statement, Kymlicka arrives at the same conclusion that Saul makes in Reflections of a 
Siamese Dream: Canada at the End of the Twentieth Century. While on the surface it 
may seem that Kymlicka is a closet communitarian, his liberal tendencies do not fully 
allow him to commit to a communitarian ideal of justice .. 
Kymlicka's revision of liberalism is a creative attempt to address the issue of 
diversity within the scope of liberalism. It does expand upon the narrow boundaries 
Rawlsian liberalism has set, however from a communitarian perspective there are certain 
theoretical weaknesses. Kymlicka in Multicultural Citizenship concedes that creating 
social unity through a condition of cultural pluralism is not an effortless task. Kymlicka 
asserts that liberalism must, in order to recognize the contemporary condition of many 
Western liberal-democracies, acknowledge that ethnic diversity exists both in theoretical 
and real terms. This does have the potential for a social fragmentation according to some 
liberal scholars, in that it overly emphasizes social difference. The fundamental challenge 
95 Ibid, pp. 190-91 
96 Ibid, pp. 188-90 
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facing liberal theory "is to identify the source of unity in a democratic multination state." 
Kymlicka writes of this task, 
The nineteenth-century English theorist A.V. Dicey once said that a stable 
multinational federation requires 'a very peculiar state of sentiment among its 
citizens, since they must desire union, and must not desire unity. Henri Bourassa 
made a similar point when he said that the 'special development' of French-
Canadian nation 'must come about in conjunction with the development of a 
more general patriotism that unifies us, without fusing us'. Liberal theory has not 
yet succeeded in clarifying the nature of this 'peculiar sentiment,.97 
Kymlicka's examination of the contemporary condition of modem multiethnic 
states attempts to bend the boundaries of traditional liberal theory to allow the 
accommodation of diversity. Furthermore, Kymlicka is correct in his assessment that 
liberalism has not found a means of clarifying the "peculiar sentiment" that A.V. Dicey 
describes. Communitarian theory would, in essence, agree with Kymlicka's 
understanding of cultural citizenship and the associated discourse regarding the 
distribution of rights. However communitarians suggest that the ideal of community is a 
key factor in the development of this 'peculiar sentiment". However, where both a 
narrow understanding of communitarianism and liberalism falls short in identifying this 
"peculiar sentiment", John Ralston Saul expounds on this throughout Reflections of a 
Siamese Dream: Canada at the End of the Twentieth Century. The essential elements 
missing from Kymlicka's liberal interpretation of the Canadian condition is found in 
Saul's work. For Saul, social diversity and the need to create a balance between 
competing interests have been the essential elements in the process of nation building.98 
97 Ibid, p. 192 
98Saul, p. 103 
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While John Ralston Saul does not specifically expose Kymlicka's perspective to analysis, 
several liberal theorists are at odds with the assertions Kymlicka makes throughout his 
body of work. 
It should not be surprising that Kymlicka's particular cultural perspective has 
attracted liberal detractors as well. Robert Howse suggests that liberalism has merely 
accommodated cultural difference, rather than deal with key theoretical issues. There is 
a neglect of the understanding of the role social actors play outside their particular 
cultural communities or the means and methods whereby which they interact with one 
another.99 This point is similar to one raised by Margaret Moore in her critique of Rawls. 
There is no real understanding provided for an accurate theoretical examination of how a 
culturally diverse society such as Canada can function orderly and peacefully, while 
other heterogeneous societies are engulfed by deep social unrest and violent conflict. 
Communitarians would respond to this liberal criticism of Kymlicka by suggesting that 
Canada, in particular in its urban centres, allows for numerous opportunities for cross-
cultural interaction. As a result numerous cultural identities are open to many people in 
that culturally diverse actors continuously share public spaces. However, it is on this 
point that Kymlicka's categorization of citizenship falls apart. An individual may 
possibly trace his/her cultural heritage to more than one cultural group. Howse suggests 
that liberalism is limited in its scope in that real boundaries exist in its sphere of 
influence. While liberalism has a duty to articulate and clearly define citizenship rights, 
99 Robert Howse, "Liberal Accommodation" in University of Toronto Law Journal Vol. XLVI, No.2 
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it must be left to individuals to decide as to the best means through which they can 
articulate their interests in a political society, a claim communitarians would not eagerly 
adopt. 1OO Overall, Howse suggests that liberalism's supreme function is to maintain the 
balance as to what is to be considered to be private and public in the process of rights 
discourse. lOl 
While the Kymlickan understanding of cultural citizenship rights may please 
communitarians scholars in some respects, he has drawn criticism from other liberals in 
his attempt to recreate a liberal conception of justice. In particular Brian Walker finds 
Kymlicka's territorial understanding of cultural politics, as illustrated in "Three Forms of 
Group-Differentiated Citizenship in Canada", unrealistic. If Kymlicka truly attempts to 
create a just society, his model does hold the potential to create a certain degree of 
unfairness. Walker, in his response to Kymlicka, suggests that decentralization may not 
necessarily be the best means through which to properly address issues related to cultural 
sovereignty.102 For Walker, culture as a whole, both that of cultural minorities and 
majorities, is continuously being shifted and remade by an age of post-modernity that 
emphasizes a condition of hyperpluralism; people have multiple and readily changeable 
identities. 103 Walker suggests that urbanization has forced people to dislocate and 
remove themselves form their culturally homogenous communities. Once resettled in a 
100 Ibid, p. 333 
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city they are surrounded by persons that differ from their own respective cultural identity. 
To compound matters, socializing agents of culture as such school, churches and 
neighbourhood associations do not gain a proper opportunity to function in that their 
membership is in flUX. 104 Walker's central thesis suggests that cultural citizenship rights 
defined through traditional and particular historic needs, as understood by Kymlicka, are 
thoroughly irrelevant. Walker suggests "when a confused 16-year-old Montrealer wants 
to figure out what to do with her life, she does not ask herself what her great-
grandmother did on the farm in Gaspe. The experiences of a farm women are just too 
dissimilar to anything we would run across in modern society ... ,,105 Cultural citizenship 
rights have been historically grounded in some conception of a particular cultural 
context, however those understandings have eroded and have not been replaced. Walker 
through his repudiation of Kymlicka's liberal culturalism, gently rejects 
comrnunitarianism as well. He suggests that the notion of community and the nurturing 
of civic culture have been lost due to the greater pressures exerted by modernity, as 
evidence by degeneration of rural areas and urban neighbourhoods.106 As a result rather 
than understanding citizenship in terms of culture, a social conception of justice must 
address the needs and concerns of an ever increasing economic underclass. In the end, 
Walker suggests that new and creative social institutions must be developed to address 
the newly emerging economic dimension of citizenship. 107 
104 Ibid, p. 218 
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This view has developed increasing support, as described by such scholars as 
Jane Jenson. Jenson suggests that the historical constructs associated with citizenship are 
shifting in light of the emergence of neo-liberal politics. As a result traditional 
understandings of community and liberal-democratic institutions no longer endure. 108 
While historically social institutions have made decisions regarding citizenship rights and 
their distribution, Jenson suggests that the state can no longer make such decisions 
independently, rather a wider democratic dialogue is needed. 109 
It is evident that liberal and communitarians disagree as to the context in which 
justice is to be defined in a democratic society. Numerous criticisms and counter-points 
have been explored with no real apparent consensus emerging. While scholars such as 
Will Kymlicka have attempted to create hybrid models that encourage a differentiation of 
cultural citizenship rights, this too has faced critical commentaries. In response, critics 
have charged that both philosophical schools are dated in that they have ignored changes 
in the social condition. The postmodem condition does indeed exist and is an important 
social dynamic. However, it has not been entirely overlooked in the debate regarding 
citizenship rights. As a result, communitarians and liberals alike find their respective 
conceptions of justice threatened by a postmodem political culture and its particular 
conceptions of justice. 
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Chapter Four 
Ethnic Pluralism and Cultural Citizenship Rights 
The discourse regarding justice and the distribution of citizenship rights is wide 
ranging. While both liberal and communitarian scholars have come to acknowledge that 
cultural diversity exists as a social reality, a debate continues as to the extent that cultural 
citizenship rights should be recognized. While liberals endorse the increased 
participation by social actors in the institutional political framework of the state, 
communitarians suggest cultural accommodation must be embraced as a defining 
characteristic of a national political culture. Though liberals and communitarians 
disagree as to the numerous issues associated with recognizing cultural diversity, both 
schools of thought have been criticized. In particular the post-modem perspective 
suggests that traditional ideals of justice associated with liberal and communitarian 
thought are redundant. Post-modernists suggest the shift to a post-industrial society has 
necessitated a debate regarding the social conception of citizenship.l10 Classical scholars 
that examine pre-Enlightenment values also share this perspective. They suggest that 
any discussion of citizenship must include an understanding of moral character. 
As a philosophy liberalism is grounded in the social, economic and political 
conditions of the Enlightenment. However, both pre-modernists and post-modernists 
assert a liberal understanding of the distribution of political power has become increasing 
110 David Lyon, Postmodemity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) pp.25-6 
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· I tIll lrre evan. Social power is no longer centralized through one governmental 
organization, but rather is widely distributed among numerous social and political actors 
Older hierarchies have been eroded liberal conceptions of justice may not necessarily 
reflect the actual social condition; liberalism must compete with other conceptions of the 
good life. 
4.1: The Spiritlessness of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate: 
The rise of communitarian thought in recent decades IS based on the 
acknowledgment that a modem sense of fragmentation and social alienation exists. 
While they point to the numerous flaws associated with a liberal conception of justice, 
communitarians suggest that the ideals associated with community can adequately 
address these concerns. Communitarian theory, through a deliberative democratic 
framework, allows for the existence of multiple conceptions of the good life. While the 
recognition of these numerous social identities. may conform to a contemporary 
understanding of political cultural, any notion of community without a focus on moral 
character is itself an entirely irrelevant concept. Ronald Beiner, writing in the classical 
tradition, suggests in Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit that neither a liberal nor a 
communitarian perspective provides an adequate description or prescription for the ills 
that befall contemporary society.112 Beiner describes himself as both a critic of liberalism 
and communitarianism. He writes, 
. .1 have no desire simply to replace the liberal's principle of rational autonomy 
with a principle of communal identity, nor see the latter principle spared the 
111 Ibid, p. 21 
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same degree of theoretical scrutiny to which liberal ideals ought to be 
submitted. As I see the matter, the problem with liberal theory is not that it 
leaves community out of account but it fails to offer a sufficiently robust 
challenge to the individualistic self-understandings of contemporary social life. 
If 'communitarianism' requires that one yield up a blanket affirmation of 
community, regardless of content, then communitarian theory becomes subject 
to precisely the same objection - namely, that it falls short of the calling of 
theory, which is to issue fearlessly radical challenges to existing self-
understandings. 113 
Beiner's criticism of both liberal and communitarian political theory is directed 
toward the work of Michael Sandel and John Rawls respectively. However, rather than 
examining their collective understandings of justice, he finds issue with the justification 
of their respective research projects. Beiner asserts that nuanced examinations of key 
philosophical questions do a disfavour to the spirit associated with intellectual inquiry.1l4 
The attempt to analyze and define a distinct understanding of self is limiting in that it 
excludes or ignores other philosophical perspectives. For Beiner, scholars must "have an 
obligation to keep the space of intellectual life as rich and open as possible.,,1l5 While 
Beiner finds issue with the direction taken by Sandel and Rawls, he does find some 
substance in the work of Will Kymlicka. 
Beiner makes specific reference to Kymlicka in that he adopts neither a purely 
liberal perspective nor a cornrnunitarian understanding of justice. Kyrnlicka's hybrid of 
liberalism and communitarianism, or as Beiner terms it "quasi-communitarian liberal 
1 \3 Ibid, p. xii 
114 Ibid, pp. 3-4 
115 Ibid, p. 17 
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pluralism", allows for the development of multiple understandings of self. 116 Kymlicka's 
inclusion of cultural citizenship allows for a "less vulnerable" and revised understanding 
of liberalism, though it lacks in one respect. ll7 Beiner does not agree with Kymlicka's 
notions of the primacy of cultural citizenship over other forms of citizenship.ll8 For 
Beiner, the concept of citizenship extends beyond mere cultural considerations. 
Through criticisms of Sandel, Rawls and Kymlicka, Beiner highlights the crux of 
his argument. Identity, cultural or otherwise, has become overly complex. As a result, 
modem understandings of the good life may not necessarily serve as accurate 
philosophical tools in the quest to understand identity, a criticism echoed by other 
scholars such as Brian Walker. 119 Overall, Beiner's project attempts to remove the 
process of intellectual inquiry from the current and widely accepted schools of 
philosophic understanding. In fact, Beiner suggests that we live in spiritless times, that 
political inquiry is uninspired. 120 In the end, Beiner submits that the best means through 
which to explore an understanding of self is to allow for an investigation of ideas that are 
free from entrenched philosophical doctrines. l2l While his pre-modem analysis does 
expose certain nuances associated with traditional liberal and communitarian 
116 Ibid, p. 42 
117 Ibid, p. 43 
118 Ibid, p. 43 
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understandings of citizenship, Beiner's analysis is deeply flawed in many respects. 
Beiner suggests political theory, specifically liberalism and communitarianism, is 
theoretically weak in that it cannot properly address the demands of citizenship 
associated with the contemporary social condition. 122 However, while Beiner asserts that 
mediocrity is the eternal enemy of philosophical inquiry, his own scholarly work, 
Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit, suffers from a clear lack of vision. 
Ronald Beiner's deconstruction of liberalism and communitarianism IS 
exceptional, however his overall thesis falls victim to the very criticisms he makes of 
contemporary political theory. The development of an innovative and creative 
theoretical mode of inquiry does not emerge from Beiner's work. While a classical 
perspective examines and critiques liberalism and communitarianism, Beiner fails to 
suggest real alternatives to these schools of thought. Philip Resnick, in reviewing 
Beiner's work, writes, 
... he is not fulfilling his own obligations as a citizen ... by offering no 
theoretical guidelines of his own to his readers ... .It now behooves him to stop 
railing against the darkness and to do his bit to help clarify the hard normative 
choices that the late twentieth century poses.123 
Beiner's project is incomplete in that his analysis does not arrive at any 
substantial conclusions. While it provides an excellent means of critically describing the 
contemporary discourse regarding citizenship rights, he does little to expand on his own 
insights. 
122 Ibid, pp. xii-xiii 
123 Philip Resnick, rev. of "Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit: Essays on Contemporary Political Theory" 
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While Beiner's project suffers from a lack of cohesion in terms of suggesting its 
own conception of citizenship, it should not be assumed that all examples of non-
liberal/communitarian analysis follow a similar pattern. Some scholars, such as Iris 
Marion Young, attempt to provide a post-modem sense of direction. In particular she 
examines the usefulness of group associations in developing an understanding of 
citizenship; Young does not follow Beiner in suggesting that we live in "spiritless times". 
While Beiner rejects blanket endorsements of community, Young acknowledges that 
citizens are not necessarily alienated from each other; we are social creatures and form 
associations with others. Young acknowledges the existence of these collective forms of 
social organization and allows for a discussion of cultural citizenship through an 
understanding of ethnic pluralism.124 Young's understanding of ethnic pluralism allows 
for an open recognition of cultural citizenship rights through a deliberative democratic 
framework. 125 
The endorsement of deliberative democracy is political quality that many political 
theorists do not oppose in principle. It is viewed favourably in that it endorses a 
discourse between diverse actors in the development of a common understanding of the 
public good. For liberal theorists such as John Rawls, the notion of deliberative 
democracy is based entirely upon the notion of institutional interest articulation. 
However, in direct contrast to Rawls, Young suggests that a true deliberation and 
political decision making can occur outside the traditional scope of Rawlsian 
124 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 
p.227 
125 Ibid, pp. 117-21 
67 
understandings of political deliberation. 126 For Young open communication is vital in 
maintaining a vibrant and functional deliberative democracy, in which there is equal 
opportunity for the articulation of interests. Young writes, 
The ideal of communicative democracy includes more than deliberative 
democracy, because it recognizes that when political dialogue aims at solving 
collective problems, it justly requires a plurality of perspectives, speaking 
styles, and ways of expressing the particularity of social situation as well as the 
general applicably of principles. A theory of democratic discussion useful to 
the contemporary world must explain the possibility of communication across 
wide differences of culture and social position. Such a theory of democracy 
needs a broad and plural conception of communication that includes both the 
expression and the extension of shared understandings, and the offering and 
acknowledge of unshared meanings. 127 
The understanding of deliberative democracy that Young presents is desirable. 
However, the context in which Young places this endorsement of a commutative society 
is that of contemporary city life. 128 
4.2: Justice and the Politics of Difference: 
While scholars such as Ronald Beiner and Brian Walker discard the role 
contemporary urban environments play in nurturing democratic discussion, Young 
suggests in Justice and the Politics of Difference that contemporary political societies 
need not be examples of social decay, but rather rich environments of political 
interaction. 129 For Young the essential historical error of political theory, in particular 
126 Ibid, pp. 22 
127 Iris Marion Young, "Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy" in Democracy 
and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Seyla Benhabib, ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), p. 132 
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liberalism, is that in the attempt to define an ideal of justice it regulates any discussion of 
social difference to the scope of private life.13o Young suggests contemporary urban 
settings are ideal environments through which a deliberative democracy can emerge 
amongst diverse social and political actors. Young's choice of city life is justified in that 
cities do attract various ethnic and social actors. l3l In Canada alone, cities are the major 
destination of new immigrants, mainly from non-European nations. 132 However Young, 
in choosing the example of city life as the basis of her model, soundly rejects the ideals 
of community that many communitarians espouse. She suggests: 
Proponents of community ... deny difference by positing fusion rather 
separation as the social ideal. They conceive the social subject as a relation of 
unity or mutuality composed by identification and symmetry among 
individuals within a totality. Communitarianism represents an urge to see 
person in unity with one another in a shared whole. 133 
Young's assertions are based on the notion that the ideal of community is 
exclusionary in that it requires a homogenization among its members in order to create 
unity, a situation that does not reflect the diversity of modern urban neighbourhoods. 134 
For Young contemporary political theory must address not merely normative demands, 
but also the requisite needs of real social actors. 
Overall Young's interpretation of modern city life is appealing in that it endorses 
openness among diverse actors. Furthermore, Young's insights regarding the modern city 
130 Ibid, p. 120 
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cannot be denied; the process of urbanization is acknowledged by liberal, 
communitarianism and classical scholars alike. However, her criticisms of 
communitarian theory are skewed in that communitarianism does not endorse a denial of 
difference. This reflects only a limited and narrow understanding of community. Young 
is mistaken to suggest communitarian theory is undemocratic and homogenizing in 
nature, a perspective that informs much of her argument. This lack of understanding 
creates a theoretical weakness in her promotion of city life as a normative and realistic 
ideal in the development of the public good. The model of a communicative political 
society that Young forwards cannot be effectively established if no real basis exists for 
its formation. By contrast, a Sandelian communitarian perspective suggests that in fact a 
society must have a pre-existing collectivist political culture that fosters democratic 
deliberation among citizens.135 Contrary to the Canadian political experience, Sandel 
suggests that American political culture is far too individualistic to foster the 
development of a collectivist identity among its citizens. Young concedes this point 
through an acknowledgment that a sense of togetherness is key to her conception of city 
. life.136 For Young social unity is created in that city life privileges face-to-face relations 
in that "city dwellers frequently venture beyond ... familiar enclaves, however, to the 
more open public of politics, commerce, and festivals, where strangers meet and 
interact." 137 Young's understanding encompasses an "erotic" understanding of city life, 
135 Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, pp. 317-51 
136 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 227 
137 Ibid, p. 237 
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in that people are drawn to the numerous and varied activities that cities offer; people are 
seduced by difference. 138 For Young the openness of city life allows for freedom, 
tolerance of diversity and a recognition of the specific needs of ethnic actors. While an 
understanding of diversity is included, Young again does not provide sufficient basis 
through which an appreciation for "diverse cultural expressions" can develop.139 There is 
little insight as to how the acknowledgment of cultural citizenship leads to the 
development of a respect and tolerance of cultural diversity.140 While few post-modem, 
liberal and communitarian scholars would frown upon the idealized version of city life 
that Young presents, it must be acknowledged that cultural freedom and tolerance do not 
necessarily thrive in a modem urban environment. While many American and Canadian 
cities function relatively well, their collective histories are scarred by cultural conflict. 
In any culturally diverse environment, urban or otherwise, it is inevitable that 
competing understandings of justice are sure to emerge. However historically the 
process of deliberating upon these competing understandings of justice and the good life 
has been limited. Women, Blacks and Native Americans have been excluded, a point 
Young does acknowledge. 141 Young is aware to some extent of the current limitations of 
city life in that they do not encompass a broader understanding of deliberative 
democracy. For Young any understanding of city life or a normative discussion of 
deliberative democracy must focus upon the equal participation of cultural groups in 
138 Ibid, p. 239 
139 Ibid, p. 240 
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developing the public agenda. Young asserts that the historic process of developing an 
understanding of the good life is skewed in that it has often been based solely on the 
nonns associated with the cultural majority.142 This process of developing the public 
good is inherently unfair in that it allows materially dominant cultural groups, primarily 
understood as Anglo-Saxon in ancestry, have a greater ability to set the political agenda. 
Traditional liberal-democratic institutions are geared toward meeting the interests of 
those who command the greatest ability to influence political and social affairs. The 
result of this process is that what is understood as just may not necessarily be 
representative of the public interest at all. 143 Furthennore, the predominant perception of 
the good life may oppress those cultural minorities who do not share similar conceptions 
(a view shared by Charles Taylor). In response, Young supports the ideal of the public 
good in that it is "open and accessible" to all citizens.144 Young openly encourages the 
free expression of difference, cultural or otherwise, through the removal of public 
barriers that hinder such expression. For Young equal access to agenda setting requires 
an open and communicative democratic process not only within the scope of city life, but 
also throughout the institutions of government. Particular cultural interests must be taken 
into account in the fonnal institutional deliberations associated with a democratic state. 
For Young the protection of cultural citizenship rights occurs not only in the 
context of city life, but throughout government as well. Young rejects any conception of 
142 Ibid, p. 59 
143 Ibid, p. 59 
144 Ibid, 119 
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moral neutrality on the part of government; legislative institutions must encourage full 
democratic participation as a means of giving voice to marginalized social groupS.145 
However, Young goes further than many communitarian theorists would in developing a 
differentiated regime of cultural citizenship rights. According to Young various cultural 
groups should be allotted formal representation in elected legislatures. 146 Young provides 
for an institutional framework through which numerous cultural groups can articulate 
their own respective particular interests and desires. She writes in Justice and the Politics 
of Difference, 
... a democratic public should provide mechanisms for effective recognition and 
representation of distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent 
groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged. Such group representation implies 
institutional mechanisms and public resources supporting (1) self-organization 
of group members so that they achieve collective empowerment and a reflect 
understanding of their collective experience and interests in the context of 
society; (2) group analysis and group generation of policy proposals in 
institutionalized contexts where decision makers are obliged to show that their 
deliberations have taken groups perspectives into consideration; and (3) group 
veto power regarding specific polices that affect a group directly, such as 
reproductive rights policy for women, or land use policy for Indian 
reservations. 147 
It is evident from Young's suggestion regarding the renewal of democratic 
institutions that she rejects outright a liberal perspective regarding the distribution of 
citizenship rights. While liberals endorse an understanding of equality that promotes 
sameness, Young allows for a deep divisions in the means through which cultural 
citizenship rights are discussed and distributed. 
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understanding of citizenship rights views Young's theoretical proposals with suspicion. 
Young openly chastises communitarianism insofar as it promotes "connotations of 
ethnicity, race, and other group identification," a perspective that Young seemingly 
endorses through institutional group representation. 148 However, while in essence 
Young's ethnic pluralism does recognize cultural diversity in the dissemination of 
citizenship rights, communitarian theory places an additional stress upon the 
development of a common good from diverse conceptions of justice. Iris Marion Young 
does not make any mention of how a clear understanding of the public good or and 
understanding of justice can develop from numerous, if not competing, interests. 
Young actively attempts to address demands for cultural citizenship rights by 
allowing for increased institutional mechanisms of interest articulation. However, this in 
tum raises several theoretical ambiguities as well. Iris Marion Young, writing of the 
American experience, asserts " ... representation for oppressed groups in the decision 
making procedures of a democratic public promotes justice better than a homogeneous 
public ... ,,149 While in a normative context such measures are well intended, in a real 
sense it does not include any specific criteria for the measure of oppression; questions 
exist as to which groups are to be considered legitimately oppressed and to what extent. 
In suggesting representation for traditionally marginalized groups, the question must be 
asked, "Who can legitimately speak for an entire group?" In the case of the First Nations 
148 Ibid, p. 234 
149 Ibid, p. 184 
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peoples, is one representative merely needed, or one for each of Canada's 600 bands?Iso 
This potential situation has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Anne Phillips comments on 
the issue, 
Can Asians be represented by Afro-Caribbeans, Hindus by Muslims, black 
women by black men? Or do these groups have nothing more in common than 
their joint experience of being excluded from power? ... Caucuses and quotas 
are the most obvious procedures for dealing with political exclusion, yet both 
depend on a prior categorization of the basis on which people have been kept 
out. Neither seems adequate to the complexity of political identities. lSI 
From Phillips' analysis, the flaw of Young's assertion becomes tragically 
apparent; cultural groups can be subdivided and internal divisions do exist within these 
groups. While Canadians do acknowledge their own particular cultural identities, such 
identities are complex and must be recognized as so. Young's proposal regarding the 
institutional representation for cultural groups duplicates many of the same theoretical 
oversights traditionally associated with liberalism. Liberalism has focused upon the 
individual as the supreme social and political unit, however Young merely replaces this 
understanding with social group self-identification, with little regard given toward 
internal differences or conflict. By contrast a communitarian understanding of cultural 
citizenship rights (and Saulian perspective) does not negate any notion of individuality or 
collective group membership, but rather attempts to find equilibrium between both these 
dimensions of citizenship. Communitarian objections to Young's ethnic pluralism are 
based on the distinct lack of discussion regarding the boundaries and limits of cultural 
150 Flanagan, "Native Sovereignty: Does Anyone Really Want an Aboriginal Archipelago?", p. 71 
151 Anne Phillips, "Dealing with Difference: A Politics ofIdeas, or a Politics of Presence?" in Democracy 
and Difference, Seyla Benhabib, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) p. 148-9 
75 
citizenship rights. Young's promotion of cultural atomization gives little insight into the 
building of a social consensus among numerous cultural actors. By giving voice to 
numerous cultural interpretations of justice and citizenship rights, a lack cohesion exists 
in the final development of Young's public good. It is entirely possible any notion of the 
public good will speak to the self-interest of particular cultural groups, rather than society 
as a whole. While Young does endorse a notion of deliberative democracy, a more 
thorough examination is needed. 
4.3: Citizenship Rights & Cultural Conflict 
While morally justified, Young's promotion of a communicative and deliberative 
democracy faces certain obstacles in considering its ultimate applicability to an actual 
political context. The picture Young presents of city life is desirable, however the 
suggestion that cultural rights be extended through formal legislative representative is a 
product of distorted optimism. Face-to-face relations and an open recognition of cultural 
diversity does not necessarily forge the development of a civil society. The awareness of 
ethnic identity has the real potential to act as a catalyst for cultural chauvinism, creating 
social fragmentation and the possibility of violent conflict. Young's understanding of 
city life is superficial in that it examines surface diversity rather than examining the 
deeper collective bonds and political values that hold together any functional society. 
However, Young does not completely ignore the role political cultural plays in the 
management of questions surrounding cultural citizenship. In "Together in Difference: 
Transforming the Logic of Group Political Conflict", Young provides an example of 
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ethnic pluralism in her examination of New Zealand and the recognition of the cultural 
citizenship rights ofthe Maori. 
The plight of the Maori in New Zealand is given consideration by Iris Marion 
Young in that it provides a model of differentiated cultural citizenship rights beyond the 
mere scope of city life. The original inhabitants of what is now New Zealand, the Maori, 
face systemic discrimination and are generally socially disadvantaged in New Zealand 
While the debate regarding differentiated rights has been heated, a Royal Commission 
suggested that citizenship rights for the Maori should be allowed to differ from other 
New Zealanders. 152 As a result, a multiple member proportional representative system 
has been adopted that allows for special representation for the Maori, thereby allowing 
their respective interests to be heard. Furthermore, this effort is coupled with an 
electoral practice that allows the Maori the ability to choose legislative representatives· 
via traditional cultural mechanisms. 153 The accommodation and respect of cultural 
difference in New Zealand extends beyond merely endorsing a bicultural society, but 
rather attempts to integrate Maori· political and social traditions into the traditional scope 
of liberal democratic government. While this agreement is relatively new, it has met 
with a certain degree of success. As with any culturally diverse society, cultural tensions 
continue to exist in New Zealand, however the nation has managed to avoid a devolution 
into violent ethnic conflict and political anarchy that has plagued so many other 
multi ethnic nations. For Young, this example highlights her ideal of cultural citizenship 
152 Iris Marion Young, "Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group Political Conflict" in 
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articulated through a fonnal legislative process. However, while this example may 
illustrate Young's ideal of ethnic pluralism, it is directly contrasted with Eastern 
European experience. 
The example of New Zealand, coupled with Eastern Europe, provides Young a 
means of comparing two distinct regimes of cultural citizenship rights. Young, using the 
New Zealand experience, establishes the point that a deliberative political process can 
indeed address the needs of marginalized cultural groups. Much like New Zealand, the 
former Yugoslavia is also a multi ethnic state. While under Soviet domination, 
Yugoslavia did not experience ethnic conflict to a large degree. However this was 
associated with a policy of cultural repression rather than actually giving voice to 
difference. 154 Cultural conflict in Eastern Europe never materialized in that official party 
dogma held that particular cultural identities would be replaced in time by a common 
solidarity among workers. 155 It has only been since the fall of the Soviet Union that 
cultural conflict has erupted in such areas asthe fonner Yugoslavia. While under the grip 
of authoritarian government, expression of cultural distinctiveness. was discouraged in 
Eastern Europe because it contravened the basic premises associated with the official 
state ideology. However, without the stifling influence of authoritarian government, 
ethnic tensions exploded. 
The examples of Eastern Europe and New Zealand provide a key insight into the 
cultural citizenship rights. Young makes a subtle, yet key point, in contrasting these two 
154 Ibid, p. 166 
155 Ibid, p. 167 
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nations. Whether authoritarian or democratic, a tacit consensus must exist among citizens 
regarding the recognition and appropriate distribution of cultural citizenship rights. A 
tolerant and open political culture must first exist prior to any public discussion regarding 
the means and mechanisms whereby which cultural citizenship rights are to be 
distributed. This iinconscious social process is implied by Young's ideal of city life, 
along with John Rawls' understanding of public reason. However such public sentiments 
cannot be manufactured, they must be a product of political culture. It is this aspect that 
is insufficiently incorporated into post-modem and traditional liberal understandings of 
citizenship. While it is vital to encourage the development of a deliberative democracy to 
allow for free and open discussion, a political will must exist amongst a polity to 
recognize the inherent value of cultural diversity. 
The examples that Young provides allow for an excellent means of examining 
actual and potential conflicts associated with a social discourse regarding cultural 
citizenship rights. Notions of deliberative democracy, tolerance and open communication 
are desirable quantities but often go unrealized. However all-encompassing ideas, such as 
Young's post-modem understanding of deliberative democracy or even Rawls notion of 
public reason, do not allow for a perspective on political culture. In recognizing 
particular forms of justice, Young must acknowledge that her post-modem perspective is 
applicable only in particular circumstances. Political culture in New Zealand is well 
suited to Young's ideal of a functional ethnic pluralism. By contrast, Young's ideal of 
open and tolerant city life would not materialized in a culturally fragmented political 
society, as found in the ethnically divided city of Sarajevo, in the former Yugoslavia. 
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For Young's ideal of ethnic pluralism to function properly, a political culture of tolerance 
must exist prior to any development of deliberative democracy. It is this quality 
associated with the post-modem perspective that has gone unarticulated by many post-
modernists. While many post-modem scholars take issue with ubiquitous universality of 
liberalism, a post-modem perspective acts as a meta-narrative as well. Post-modem 
theory attempts to address issues of global change and recognize particular identities, 
however does not itself acknowledge its own theoretical limitations. While valid as a 
means of analysis, a post-modem perspective is not wholly applicable to all political 
contexts. By contrast communitarian theory has never assumed to act as a meta-narrative 
in any capacity. While communitarianism does find a need for a discussion surrounding 
the value of community in contemporary philosophical inquiry, communitarian theory 
does not purport to export its particular political perspective to all political societies. 
The post-modem perspective that Young asserts is inherently tied to political 
culture. While Young makes this point indirectly, it is an elemental understanding of 
communitarian theory. Overall, communitarian thought advocates a greater incorporation 
of community, and in the process recognizes that communities are composed of a 
diversity of actors. However, this understanding is coupled with a recognition that a 
communitarian perspective may not necessarily be applicable to all political systems. 
Michael Sandel arrives at this conclusion in Democracy's Discontent. While he favours a 
type of political society advocated by communitarian scholars, American political culture 
cannot actively respond to the dimensions of communitarianism. 156 Communitarian 
156 Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, pp. 317-51 
80 
theory does not blindly endorse a collectivist political culture, but rather provides a 
means of understanding political societies that already display collectivist tendencies. It 
is this specific quality of communitarian thought that allows for the examination of the 
Canadian condition. Canada has always focussed upon the common good while allowing 
different cultural perspectives to be voiced. As a result a communitarian perspective 
allows for greater insight into the Canadian political experience. 
4.4: The Canadian Communitarian Project 
While various notions of community and communitarianism have been examined 
in Canada, a large wealth of research has been conducted in the United States as well. 
Consequently, many scholars have focused on community in an American context. This 
focus by American academics is largely due to the realization of the loss of community 
values in towns, cities and neighbourhoods. However, among communitarian scholars 
various interpretations exist. American political theorists have primarily examined the 
issue of community in terms of reviving lost notions of small-scale, localized and directly 
democratic communities. IS7 By contrast, what research has been done in Canada has 
centred on the collectivist tendencies associated with Canadian political culture as a 
whole. ISS To this end Canadian scholars such as Saul and Taylor have examined 
citizenship rights from a larger perspective, thus incorporating elements that have 
preoccupied the national consciousness, such as cultural citizenship. 
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While historically Canadians have always put issues of cultural citizenship on the 
political agenda, this pattern has gradually come to the forefront in recent decades. 
Culturally heterogeneous societies are no longer the norm in North America. As a result 
communitarian theory, in order to maintain its currency, must examine the means 
through which a common good can be fostered through a diversity of cultural interests. 
This perspective has gained support from Michael Walzer, who suggests in On 
Toleration, that traditional models of understanding political culture have crumbled. 
Contemporary political societies can no longer be understand primarily in terms of 
institutional governance. 159 Modem political societies are immigrant societies in that 
social and ethnic diversity abounds. 160 The result is that multiple and competing 
conceptions of the justice have emerged and over time, as Walzer contends, have eroded 
the traditional values associated with a given political culture. 161 This is alluded to by 
Sandel in Democracy's Discontent through his mention of the erosion of Jefferson values 
in light of a distracted and increasingly alienated political citizenry.162 While Walzer 
examines the American condition, it should not be entirely assumed that Canada is 
immune from his analysis. 
The gradual deterioration of traditional liberal-democratic values is a global 
phenomenon. Traditional conceptions of social organization have shifted as well. 
Young suggests that modem cities are models of interethnic interactions, a point Walzer 
159 Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) p. 87 
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furthers through his assertion that personal identity has become more complex, as 
evidenced by interethnic marriages. 163 However Walzer makes the point that this 
increased focus on cultural citizenship can lead to a certain degree of social tension and 
conflict. Walzer carries on by suggesting that those societies that include toleration as a 
core political value are better able to adjust to emerging issues concerning notions of 
cultural citizenship rights. Canada has had historically the capacity to acknowledge and 
recognize the different needs of cultural actors. While forging a conception of the 
common good is a fundamental challenge, a society predisposed toward managing issues 
of diversity is better suited toward addressing the dissemination of cultural citizenship 
rights. 
Beyond the mere institutional mechanisms, a fundamental understanding of the 
Canadian condition is needed to grasp the communitarian project as a whole. Canada is 
only one of many culturally diverse nations, however it has managed to avoid civil war 
that has plagued such nations as the former Yugoslavia. It might be assumed that 
through the recognition of difference and the accordance of certain rights to cultural 
minorities, Canadians have enjoyed a relatively civil existence. However, this is only a 
superficial understanding of the Canadian experience. While broadly based political 
models provide insight in the functioning of a particular nation, they cannot account for 
the specific nuances of political culture associated with a polity. David Bell and Lome 
Tepperman, in The Roots of Disunity, provide a clearer understanding of issues 
surrounding cultural citizenship in Canada and how diversity has been managed. Both 
163 Walzer, On Toleration, p. 88 
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authors not only examine the historical context in which Canadian political culture has 
developed, but also its future direction. 
For Bell and Tepperman the understanding of the Canadian condition is 
multifaceted. While differentiated cultural citizenship rights were recognized prior to 
Confederation, accommodation of difference extends beyond cultural considerations. 
Both authors suggest that issues surrounding the accommodation of cultural difference 
are also coupled with managing regional interests. 164 As a result, tolerance of difference 
and the real acknowledgment of varying cultural and regional needs have impacted the 
developed of the Canadian psyche. This need to accommodate difference is viewed by 
Canadians as a necessary political tool. Bell and Tepperman propose that Canadians are 
acutely aware that Canada is in many ways fragmented and thus a national consensus 
must be arrived upon if the process of nation-building is to continue. 165 Despite the 
numerous differences that divide Canada, an underlying sense of co-operation exists; 
there is a distinct emphasis on the articulation of a common good. To this end, Bell and 
Tepperman point out that Canadians are inherently drawn toward strong visions that 
foster, nurture and speak to the collective good such as Sir John A. Macdonald's National 
Policy, John Diefenbaker's "Northern Vision" and Pierre Trudeau's "Just Society".166 
While Canadians are more than aware of their own particular cultural interests, they also 
understand the larger national scope in which they exist. The Roots of Disunity provides 
a key understanding of the political values that have aided in the development of the 
164 Bell & Teppennan, p. 247 
165 Ibid, p. 249-50 
166 Ibid, p. 249 
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Canadian condition, values that conform to a communitarian understanding of a civic 
society. However Bell and Tepperman conclude with the suggestion that a modem 
discourse regarding a vision of the common good has been absent from the national 
scene in recent decades. They write, "National unity cannot be created out of such flimsy 
stuff. The political culture must be revitalized; worthwhile collective goals identified.,,167 
This continuous focus on the development of the collective good is a key aspect that 
corresponds to communitarian theoretical principles as well. Many communitarians 
would agree with Bell's and Tepperman's assessment regarding the continuous nurturing 
of the common good. Communitarians do not assume that political values such as 
tolerance are organic, rather they are human creations that must be continuously fostered 
by government and individuals actors in society. John Ralston Saul shares the 
perspective, suggesting that Canadian elites have historically needed to navigate a 
complex series of national issues ranging from cultural diversity to geography. As a 
result, a capacity for comprise was needed to balance a constantly shifting political 
landscape. 168 For Saul, the conditions of Canadian nationhood necessitated an 
understanding by political actors that the success of Canada was based not on a rational 
myth, by through cooperation, compromise and the moderation of multiple interests. 169 
By contrast liberal political values are static; they remain steadfast symbols of human 
objectives. 
167 Ibid, p. 250 
168 Saul, pp 104-105 
169 Ibid, p. 113 
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The work of John Ralston Saul, David Bell and Lome Teppennan provides an 
excellent analysis of the historical and social development of political values in Canada. 
However, it is evident that in the discussion of cultural citizenship rights, other nations 
have managed diversity differently. This is evidenced by Iris Marion Young's 
examination of ethnic pluralism, and lack thereof, in New Zealand and the fonner 
Yugoslavia. Furthennore, even communitarian perspectives regarding the development 
of the common good differ. The great majority of communitarian literature focuses upon 
the American political experience, as expounded by Michael Sandel or Michael Walzer. 
However, Canadian scholars, such as Charles Taylor, provide a detailed examination of 
the Canadian political condition. Taylor's Multiculturalism and "The Politics of 
Recognition" yields great insight into how citizenship rights are deliberated upon and 
distributed in Canada. 170 Truqugh Taylor's analysis an understanding of a distinct 
Canadian fonn of communitarianism emerges. This Canadian commurIitarianism differs 
dramatically from the traditional American understanding of community. While 
American communitarian theorists focus upon small-scale and localized community 
structures, Taylor examines on a national scale the role differentiated cultural citizenship 
rights play in the development of the common good. 
170 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" 
Amy Gutmann, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) pp. 25-73 
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Chapter Five 
From the Extremes to an Equilibrium: 
Balancing Cultural Citizenship in Canada 
The examination· of cultural citizenship rights is a central theme of many 
contemporary political paradigms. However, while these schools of thought attempt to 
address issues concerning citizenship, several anomalies continue to exist. In particular, 
it has become evident to many scholars that no single school of political thought can 
adequately address the demands of contemporary cultural citizenship. Liberalism, for 
instance, has traditionally asserted that a regime of common and universal rights should 
be equally applicable to all persons. This view, supported by liberal theorists such as 
Robert Dahl and John Rawls, has come under attack in recent decades. While liberal 
theory asserts that government is morally neutral, it is evident that in practise the state 
does indeed involve itself in issues concerning cultural citizenship. In response scholars 
such as Will Kymlicka allow liberalism a certain degree of latitude in acknowledging the 
need for cultural citizenship rights. While this shift may satisfy the normative demands of 
contemporary political theory, this enlightened form of liberalism has become skewed. 
In the potential application of such regime of citizenship rights, consideration is not 
always given equally to all cultural groups. Ronald Beiner refers to this issue directly in 
his discussion regarding the distribution and protection of citizenship rights. For Beiner, 
liberalism's fatal flaw rests on the premise that it does not adequately address the need to 
develop a consensus regarding the how citizenship rights are to be reasonably defined 
and distributed. He writes in Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit, 
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Why would the state go to the effort of encouraging the viability of a 
particular way of life unless it was thought that way of life was worthwhile 
enough to support? If it is a question of maximizing consumer choice among a 
variety of possible ways of life, why not subsidize that way of life of 
transvestites (if we allow that such individuals participate in a larger 
transvestite culture)? A strict neutralist liberal should demand the same share 
of state resources to maintain the transvestite way of life as to protect from 
extinction a threaten aboriginal culture. 171 
While Beiner's comments are directed toward a Kymlickan understanding of 
liberalism, they address a larger issue surrounding a liberal conception of justice. 
Kymlicka, along with Rawls and Dahl, does not effectively distinguish between the 
differing needs of specific cultural actors. It is this theoretical limitation that has caused 
some scholars, including Beiner, to find a liberal understanding of justice incomplete. 
While a deep recognition of social diversity is lacking from a liberal perspective, 
post-modem scholars have actively acknowledged difference. Iris Marion Young, in 
Justice and the Politics of Difference, goes as far as to emphasize social difference as the 
hallmark of her ideal conception of city life. For many post-modernists, traditional 
theoretical doctrines have little relevance in a contemporary society composed of 
complex personal identities. As a result, the post-modernist perspective endorses a 
conception of justice that allows for multiple, if not competing, understandings of 
citizenship. In the process, claims of liberal neutrality and universality are viewed by 
post-modernists as a denial of difference and socially oppressive. 
Post-modernists, while taking issue with liberal conceptions of justice, also direct 
their criticisms toward communitarian theory. Iris Marion Young specifically takes issue 
with communitarianism's focus on the common good. In Justice and the Politics of 
171 Beiner, Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit, pp. 42-3 
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Difference, Young suggests that an emphasis on the common good restricts the cultural 
expression of the individual. In response, Young favours the notion of public good, a 
democratic framework that allows for open deliberation among diverse actors. 172 
However this "open and accessible" political ideal that Young presents is desirable, yet 
limited in scope in that it does not provide specific detail as to the means through which 
competing understandings of good life are to be deliberated upon. Furthermore, aside for 
the functional ambiguities associated with Young's conception of ideal city life, another 
weakness is associated with her model. While Young devotes considerable energy to 
finding fault with traditional liberal and communitarian conceptions of justice and 
citizenship rights, her analysis is misdirected at times. 
Throughout Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young's criticisms are targeted 
toward such stalwarts of the academic community as John Rawls and Michael Sandel. 
However, while her criticisms and insights are valid in many respects, it must be noted 
that the work of the aforementioned authors do not typify the whole body of literature 
concerning their respective theoretical perspectives. In particular, Young takes issue 
with Sandel's preoccupation with community, however it should not be assumed that 
Sandel's own understanding of communitarian theory is representative of an entire school 
of thought. 173 Rather it is a nuanced analysis that exists within a specific context, as 
evidenced in Democracy's Discontent and its almost exclusive focus on the American 
expenence. In the end Young falls victim to the same theoretical limitations that 
172 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 118 
173 Ibid, p. 230 
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Kymlicka and Sandel encounter. Young commits herself to a regime of citizenship rights 
that, in the end, limits the means through which citizenship can be defined. Ronald 
Beiner suggests that Young's unwavering commitment to her own perspective is 
indicative of a larger challenge facing contemporary political theory as a whole. 174 
Beiner contends that theoretical discourse is based on extremes; little. room is left to 
examine competing perspectives. As a result, the narrowing of philosophical debate has 
limited the options through which cultural citizenship rights may potentially be defined. 
5.1: Political Theory on the Extremes 
For Beiner, questions regarding citizenship are intimately connected to the 
notion of building a stable political community, an assertion many traditional liberals and 
communitarian scholars would find entirely valid. 175 However, Beiner suggests that 
contemporary political discourse should not merely attempt to consider citizenship as a 
ideal, but rather actively investigate the means through which the boundaries of 
citizenship are defined. For Beiner, the current discourse regarding citizenship is based 
on a choice of two particularly undesirable extremes. He writes in Theorizing 
Citizenship, 
Lying at the heart of this dilemma is what I would call the 
"universalism/particularism conundrum." To opt wholeheartedly for 
universalism implies deracination - rootlessness. To opt wholeheartedly for 
particularism implies parochialism, exclusivity and narrow-minded closure of 
horizon. Yet it is by no means clear that a viable synthesis of particularistic 
rootedness and universalistic openness is philosophically or practically 
available. In practice, and perhaps even in theory, we always seems to get 
drawn to one unsatisfactory extreme or the other. This elusive synthesis of 
174 Ronald Beiner, Theorizing Citizenship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995) pp. 5-6 
175 Ibid, p. 3 
90 
liberal cosmopolitan and illiberal particularism, to extent that it is attainable, is 
what I want to call "citizenship".176 
Ronald Beiner, in his usual fashion, exposes the weakness of not only political 
theory's means of inquiry, by also the premise upon which that inquiry has been 
constructed. Beiner's rejection of stagnant and established paradigms is based on the 
notion that contemporary understandings of citizenship have become overly complex; 
one specific theoretical mechanism does not adequately address the diverse needs 
associated with the contemporary demands of citizenship. For instance, Michael Walzer's 
communitarian ideal of the "civil society" is appealing in many respects in that it is 
modem and state-centred, however Beiner makes several key objections. Beiner 
contends that Walzer's ideal of citizenship, in which people are tied together through a 
multitude of voluntary associations, is in fact a denial of difference. 177 It excludes those 
memberships that exist outside the "civil society". Walzer's notion of citizenship must be 
localized to function properly, however in an increasingly global society, this ideal is 
somewhat impractical. 178 The other extreme, represented by Iris Marion Young's full 
recognition of cultural difference, that being "the politics of difference", holds the 
possibility for cultural fragmentation. 179 Radical pluralism, while recognizing difference, 
does little to reinforce social bonds or a unified conception of citizenship. Beiner 
comments that by fully adopting Young's perspective, "citizenship would then be 
176 Ibid, pp. 12-13 
177 Ibid, pp. 4-5 
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reduced to an aggregate of subnational ghettos" if groupist identity were reinforced. 180 
Beiner is not alone in his criticism of the predominance of theoretical extremes in the 
discourse surrounding citizenship rights. This perspective is supported by the work of 
Charles Taylor in his examination of the Canadian condition. 
The polarization of contemporary political theory is an issue to which Charles 
Taylor devotes a considerable amount of energy. Specifically, Taylor points to the 
"Liberal-Communitarian Debate" as the prime example of the narrowing of political 
discussion and inquiry. Criticisms directed toward Young, Sandel, Rawls and Dahl, 
among others, is indicative of a situation that ignores the attempt to establish a practical 
and theoretical middleground between philosophic extremes. Taylor writes in "Cross-
Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate": 
The portmanteau terms "Liberal" and "Communitarian" will probably have to be 
scrapped before we can get over this, because they carry the implication that 
there is only one issue here, or that someone's position on one determines what 
he holds on the other. But a cursory look at the gamut of actual philosophical 
positions shown exactly the contrary. Either stand on the atomism-holism debate 
can be combined with either stand on individualist-collectivist questions. There 
are not only atomic individualist and holist collectivist, but also holist 
individualist...and even atomist collectivists. 181 
Taylor's acute analysis allows for a greater scope surrounding the discourse 
regarding citizenship rights. The work of leading theorists such as Michael Sandel or Iris 
Marion Young should be viewed as a beginning rather that the end of a discourse 
surrounding citizenship rights. They merely give voice to a particular interpretation of 
citizenship. 
180 Ibid, p. 8 
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Taylor's critique of contemporary theory suggests that while a certain perspective 
may be valid, it must also be qualified. The form of ethnic pluralism that Young 
promotes, as evidenced by the political experience of New Zealand, has little 
applicability in culturally conflicted nations such as the former Yugoslavia. Taylor 
himself rejects radical ethnic pluralism in favour of a notion of collective good, though 
his version differs remarkably from the understanding of collectivity endorsed by 
Michael Sandel. 182 Sandel, focusing on the United States, discusses the notion of 
common good with little reference given to the contemporary demands of cultural 
citizenship. By contrast, Charles Taylor specifically examines the development of the 
common good through an active public discussion regarding cultural diversity. Taylor's 
perspective allows for an examination of Canada's communitarian political culture, one 
that suggests a focus on the common good achieved through the open recognition and 
dissemination of cultural citizenship rights. Charles Taylor further explains this 
perspective in Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition". While it does not deal 
thoroughly with the Canadian condition, Taylor uses the Canadian experience as an 
example to discuss the moral basis and functional aspects for the open acknowledgment 
of cultural difference in a collectivist oriented society. 
5.2: The Politics of Recognition 
Taylor's core philosophical assertions are highly critical of traditional 
understandings of justice with regard to cultural considerations. In Multiculturalism and 
"The Politics of Recognition" Taylor explores the elemental questions that have 
182 Ibid, p. 163 
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polarized the "Liberal-Communitarian Debate", For Taylor the crux of the issue lies in 
the recognition of identity politics as an essential tool in nation-building and the 
strengthening of the democratic process as a whole, an element American theorists such 
as Walzer and Sandel do not incorporate. It is through this concept that Taylor develops 
his argument for the recognition of differentiated regimes of cultural citizenship. Taylor 
provides a normative approach in which multiple conceptions of the good life can be 
incorporated. Amy Gutmann, in commenting upon Taylor's key points, writes, 
Multicultural societies and communities that stand for the freedom and 
equality of all people rest upon mutual respect for reasonable intellectual, 
political, and cultural differences. Mutual respect requires a widespread 
willingness and ability to articulate our disagreements, to defend them before 
people with whom we disagree, to discern the difference between respectable 
and disrespectable disagreement, and to be open to changing our own minds 
when faced with well-reasoned criticism. The moral promise of 
multiculturalism depends on the exercise of these deliberative virtues. 183 
Gutmann, a liberal, finds fault with the overarching assumption that social 
difference is a liability in the process of nation building. It is this concept that informs 
Taylor's overall thesis. 
As a scholar whose work exhibits communitarian characteristics, Taylor does not 
accept a strict liberal individualist influenced rights discourse. For Taylor, the denial of 
difference is tantamount to a form of oppression; the recognition of identity is a basic 
human right. He comments, " ... misrecognition shows not just a lack of respect. It can 
inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due 
183 Amy Gutmann, "Introduction" in Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", Amy Gutmann, 
ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p. 24 
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recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.,,184 However, 
Taylor is quick to note that his ideal of citizenship is not inherently anti-liberal, rather it 
exists as an extension of traditionally liberal themes of social justice. Taylor develops a 
comparison by commenting: 
Everyone should be recognized for his or her unique identity. But recognition 
here means something else. With the politics of equal dignity, what is 
established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights 
and immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked to 
recognized is the unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctness 
from everyone else. The idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has 
been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity.18S 
Taylor continues by suggesting that to force citizens to conform to the cultural 
identity of the majority creates a form of second-class citizenship.186 Historically, 
liberals have focused upon creating equity among marginalized groups through programs 
and government initiatives designed to respond to inequities in socio-economic 
conditions. As a result, priority is given to allow the poor to equally participate in the 
process of national agenda setting. However for Taylor this is insufficient and suggests 
that special opportunities be developed for cultural minorities who find themselves 
marginalized as well. The broad social discourse that Taylor endorses is the moral 
responsibility of not only non-public actors, but the state as well. He asserts that an 
acknowledgment of cultural difference and associated needs does not radically differ 
184 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 26 
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from a recognition by the state of socio-economic disparities. I87 However, it is upon this 
point that recognition of cultural difference becomes complex. 
By recognizing difference it should not be assumed that in the final analysis all 
persons require similar mechanisms for cultural expression in society.I88 This point is 
also emphasized by Michael Walzer's notion of "Complex Equality". However, the non-
universal distribution of citizenship rights creates practical and theoretical problems that 
must be addressed. For instance, while it can certainly be argued that Francophones and 
First Nations peoples are culturally threatened by an English speaking majority in 
Canada, as separate cultural entities they possess dissimilar cultural needs. 
Francophones have traditionally espoused their cultural needs through the institutional 
instruments of articulation available through the church and/or state in Quebec. By 
contrast, Canada's First Nations do not reside in one particular area of the country and are 
as a whole culturally dissimilar. As a result, any evaluation of cultural citizenship must 
address the different needs and circumstances associated with each particular cultural 
group. The matter complicates itself in that by meeting the particular demands of a 
specific cultural group, it may adversely impact the interests of others who do share a 
similar need for cultural guarantees. The example of Quebec again illustrates this 
situation. Historically, Quebecers and the Quebec government have articulated the 
interests of Francophones in that, within a national scope, they are a cultural minority. 
However, though the vast majority of Francophones reside in Quebec, any formal legal 
187 Ibid, p. 39 
188 Ibid, p. 39 
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recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness would detrimentally affect the almost one million 
Francophones outside the province, primarily residing in New Brunswick, Ontario and 
Manitoba. If, as in the case of Quebec, cultural citizenship rights are to be legally 
defined territorially, such an understanding would only further marginalize those outside 
this geographically defined boundary; they would not enjoy similar guarantees of cultural 
protection. The case Charles Taylor makes for recognizing difference is morally 
justified, however real concerns do emerge in the practical implementation of a regime 
differentiated cultural citizenship rights. 
Taylor notes that conflict and cultural tensions are inevitable in a society that 
chooses to recognize the rights of cultural groups. As a result, though Canada has come 
to adopt a bill of rights that is aligned with an American understanding of jurisprudence, 
it also includes provisions that protects the rights of First Nations people and linguistic 
minorities. 189 In part, Taylor suggests such a formal legal recognition is purposeful in 
any nation that openly recognizes its own cultural diversity. To this end, such nations 
must have appropriate constitutional mechanisms through which to mediate conflicting 
interests. 190 In Quebec, though it is considered reasonable in some circles for legislation 
to exist that limits the use of English language signs for businesses, it is seen as a threat 
by the English- speaking minority in the province. 191 Though on this particular issue the 
notwithstanding clause has been used, the issue of balancing cultural rights against 
fundamental freedoms continues to be in the forefront of the public mind. Taylor 
189 Ibid, p. 52 
190 Ibid, p. 52 
191 Ibid, p. 52-3 
97 
suggests that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms not only acts as a means 
whereby which the interests of cultural minorities are protected, but as a mechanism in 
which a balance can be maintained between the basic tenets associated with individual 
liberty and the recognition of cultural citizenship rights. 192 
The idea of maintaining equilibrium among a diversity of interests is an issue that 
scholars such as John Ralston Saul, Kenneth McRae and Seymour Martin Lipset touch 
upon in their political/historical analysis of cultural diversity in Canada. Charles Taylor 
suggests a similar pattern was adopted and can be interpreted in the spirit of the Charter. 
While it is more than evident that cultural tensions continue to exist in Canada, a tacit 
social contract binds Canadians together which stresses a process of open deliberation as 
an essential element in nation-building. The common good is directly based on the 
capacity of Canadians to provide and engage in a public discourse concerning citizenship 
rights. Taylor writes of this Canadian condition: 
A society with strong collective goals can be liberal, on this view, provided it 
is also capable of respective diversity, especially when dealing with those who 
do not share common goals; and provided it can offer adequate safeguards for 
fundamental rights. There will undoubtedly be tensions and difficulties in 
pursuing these objectives together, but such a pursuit is not impossible, and the 
problems are not in principle greater than those encountered by any liberal 
society that has to combine, for example, liberty and equality, or prosperity and 
justice.193 
The crux of Taylor's argument lies in the recognition that indeed the Canadian 
condition is anything but ideal, however in the process of national consensus building, 
outlets must exist whereby competing notions of the good life can be discussed freely. If 
192 Ibid, p. 53-4 
193 Ibid, p. 59 
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such mechanisms do not exist, there is great potential for inter-ethnic tensions and violent 
conflict, as evidenced in the former Yugoslavia. While the model Taylor outlines liberal 
inspired institutions of mediating conflicting interests, the process endorsed by Taylor 
differs substantively from a liberal understanding of rights discourse. 
5.3: Communitarian Substantive Justice 
In the Canadian example, as illustrated by Taylor, institutional mechanisms play 
an influential role in the articulation of the demands of cultural actors. While Canadian 
institutions are constructed on a liberal-democratic model, they are intimately connected 
to a more general public discourse surrounding citizenship rights. This view is also 
identified and shared by scholars such as McRae, Lipset, and Dallmayr in their respective 
discussions regarding the Canadian political condition. In particular, Fred Dallmayr's 
own notion of cultural citizenship is compatible with Taylor's in that both endorse the 
removal of liberalism's narrow boundaries. Furthermore both theorists suggest while 
some trappings of proceduralism are necessary in the public discourse regarding 
citizenship rights, it should not confine itself to strict this neutralist liberal institutional 
interpretations of justice. A broad perspective is required by formal institutions to fully 
understand the needs and address the demands of Canada's many cultural actors. 194 The 
judicial system cannot remove itself nor hover above the discourse surrounding 
citizenship, rather it must act along side other public actors. Fred Dallmayr writes, 
In a democratic setting hostile to both ethnocentrism and universalist levelling, 
cultivation of diversity cannot solely rely on existing procedural safeguards -
although the latter must not be lightly discarded or set aside ... Clearly, to avoid 
194 Ibid, p. 61 
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the pitfalls of communalism as well as universalist assimilation, new paths 
need to be explored on levels of both institutional arrangements and political 
reflection. 195 
Institutions in Canada have the moral and legal authority to act as the "Great 
Equalizer" in the constant pull between universalism and particularism; they promote the 
creation and maintenance of the middleground Dallmayr, Taylor and Beiner search for. 
However, while both Beiner and Taylor make a significant contribution concerning the 
substantive theoretical premise upon which the Canadian political experience can be 
understood, Dallmayr's model permits for examination of the institutional mechanisms 
that allow for a balance to be maintained between competing interests. While these 
institutional mechanisms allow the state to take an active leadership role in the 
development of a public discourse surrounding citizenship rights, the state also has the 
potential to obscure matters as well. In the attempt to facilitate the articulation of a 
common good, government institutions can divide cultural actors amongst themselves as 
well. 
The perspective Dallmayr adopts regarding cultural citizenship rights in Canada 
is not unique; it echoes Charles Taylor's and John Ralston Saul's overall thesis as well. 
However, Fred Dallmayr's own examination of the Canadian condition differs somewhat 
from them in that it carries with it a less abstract theoretical component. For Dallmayr, 
his focus primarily investigates the maintenance of the democratic project in Canada in 
light of an open recognition of cultural diversity. Dallmayr, building on· Taylor's 
understanding of public discourse, suggests that the model adopted by Canada is 
195 Dallmayr, p. 289 
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desirable in that it endorses open communication amongst a diversity of social actors 
outside formal institutions of interest articulation. Within the larger scope of the 
international community, the Canadian model offers an example for nation building for 
the fragile emerging multi-ethnic democracies of Africa and Asia. l96 To this end, 
Dallmayr identifies specific qualities that have lead to the success of the Canadian model. 
He writes in "Democracy and Multiculturalism", 
There are several aspects that render the Canadian case noteworthy and 
instructive. One is the high political saliency of cultural pluralism and 
diversity. More than elsewhere (in the West), multiculturalism has been the 
topic of intense public and constitutional debate - which may have to do with 
the fact Canada has never fully subscribed to the assimilationist or "melting 
pot" ideal of her neighbour. In 1967, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism issued a report that focused attention both on rights of citizenship 
and on problems of cultural diversity. Largely in response to this reports, the 
national government four years later announced an explicitly "multicultural" 
policy that, while stressing equal rights of all Canadians, also sought to protect 
the distinct life forms or cultures of minorities. A similar outlook was 
embodies a decade later in the Canadian "Charter of Rights and Freedoms," 
which, clearly center-staging the liberal principle of equal individual freedom, 
also made reference to· the "preservation and enhancement of the multicultural 
heritage of Canadians. 197 
While the role public institutions play in defining cultural citizenship is vital, 
Dallmayr suggests that they are deeply influenced by political culture (a perspective Saul 
would share as well) and the limits the people place upon institutional actors. This is not 
only visible through such formal public consultations as the Royal Commission of 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism or the adoption of an official policy of multiculturalism 
196 Ibid, p. 288 
197 Ibid, p. 285 
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III 1971, but it is also evidenced in the language through which public discourse is 
conducted. 
Semantics have historically played a large role in the deliberative democratic 
process of defining cultural citizenship in Canada. The phrase "distinct society", in 
reference to Quebec's constitutional status, is a continuously contentious issue among 
Canadians. Even the word "multiculturalism" takes· on a different meaning outside 
Canada. Abroad the term "multiculturalism" is often portrayed as a form of ethnic 
pluralism, with a distinct emphasis in cultural separation.198 Multiculturalism, as 
understood by Charles Taylor, differs from the type of ethnic pluralism endorsed by such 
American scholars as Iris Marion Young. While both ideas recognize cultural diversity 
and the issues that surround it, multiculturalism in Canada incorporates an element of 
social discourse between diverse actors. While indeed ethnic pluralism exists in Canada 
and endorsed by the state, an element of cross-cultural interaction is emphasized as well. 
Multiculturalism, both as a policy and popular myth incorporates notions of openness, 
interaction and foremost toleration of difference, ideals that are not always present is 
other discourses concerning cultural citizenship rights. 
5.4: Taylor's Critics 
In the attempt to define citizenship rights, political theories often set boundaries 
and limits. The notion of a communitarian inspired understanding of Canada, promoted 
by Fred Dallmayr, John Ralston Saul and Charles Taylor, exists outside the scope of the 
extremes associated with traditional liberal or communitarian understandings of 
198 See Driedger's Multi-Ethnic Canada, pp. 34-44 for a detailed description of various definitions of 
multiculturalism 
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citizenship. However, while the analyses provided by Dallmayr and Taylor are sound, 
critics abound. In particular, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" has 
drawn some criticism by more traditional political theorists. In directly questioning 
Taylor's ideal of recognizing and responding to the needs of cultural groups, Steven C. 
Rockefeller suggests that the liberal perspective has been unfairly dismissed by Taylor. 
Furthermore, Rockefeller proposes that Taylor's perspective displays some undemocratic 
tendencies. He writes, 
When a liberal society faces the question of granting special privileges, 
immunities, and political autonomy to one cultural group such as French 
Canadians in Quebec, it cannot compromise on fundamental human rights, as 
Professor Taylor acknowledges. Furthermore, those who understand liberal 
democracy as itself a way of life grounded in a distinct moral faith cannot in 
good conscience agree to allow schools or the government to suppress the 
democratic way of growth and transformation. The democratic way conflicts 
with any rigid idea of, or absolute rights to cultural survival. The democratic 
way means respect for and openness to all cultures, but it also challenges all 
cultures to abandon those intellectual and moral values that are inconsistent 
with the ideals of freedom, equality, and the ongoing cooperative experimental 
search for truth and well-being. 199 
The point Rockefeller forwards is entirely valid, however in making his argument 
he ignores Taylor's primary thesis. For Taylor the accommodation of cultural interests is 
neither at the expense of individual democratic rights nor other cultural minorities. In 
fact, Taylor suggests that cultural survival is an issue that cannot be adequately addressed 
through a traditional narrow understanding of proceduralism liberalism. Government 
must move beyond mere liberal inspired proceduralism and be fully conscious of the 
potential tensions arising from a recognition of cultural citizenship. The state must 
199 Steven C. Rockefeller, "Comment" in Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", Charles 
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remain proactive in nurturing a tolerant civic culture in the attempt to balance the varied 
interests of not only the individual and group-oriented interests.2oo It is this concept that 
eludes liberal theory; citizenship is multidimensional and adequate social and political 
safeguards must exist in the recognition of this fact. While on the surface Canada may 
have the institutional trappings of proceduralism, the actual functionality more closely 
resembles a substantive process. 
While Rockefeller approaches Taylor's work from a liberal perspective, Michael 
Walzer critiques Taylor in a uniquely communitarian fashion. Walzer, an ardent 
communitarian, asserts that Charles Taylor promotes a merely revised understanding of 
liberalism. Walzer suggests that two distinct types of liberalism exist. Firstly, liberal 
rights discourse can be understood through a commitment to state neutrality in the 
determination of citizenship rights. This kind of liberalism, supported by scholars such 
as Steven C. Rockefeller, John Rawls and others, emphasizes personal freedom and 
individual liberty with little mention of collective goals. By contrast, Walzer asserts that 
Charles Taylor supports a more cosmopolitan version of liberalism, a substantive one 
that allows for state intervention in meeting the varied demands of cultural citizenship.201 
However for Walzer the actual application of both these types of liberalism is not as clear 
as their respective theoretical distinctions; he comments that the type of liberalism Taylor 
supports lends itself to confusion. Walzer writes, 
200 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 61 
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Now the state is called upon to take the responsibility for everyone's 
(cultural) survivaL.Once again, I do not know what state policies this would in 
fact require. What would the states have to do to guarantee or even to begin to 
guarantee he survival of all minorities that make up American society? It 
would surely have to move beyond official recognition of the equal value of 
the different ways of life. The various minority groups would need control 
over public monies, segregated or partially segregated schools, employment 
quotas that encouraged people to register with this or that group, and so on?02 
Walzer, in examining "The Politics of Recognition", colours Taylor's arguments 
as an advocation of a type of ethnic pluralism, one in which ethnic identity predominates 
as the primary consideration in the development of citizenship rights. In light of this 
observation, Walzer suggests that a focus on individual liberty, in the end, may be the 
best means through which cultural guarantees can be extended by government. Walzer 
does not see any hindrances associated with the study and recognition of otherness within 
the context of traditional understandings of liberalism. Walzer, in his concluding 
statements suggests the recognition of difference, within a more traditional liberal 
perspective, would encourage the exploration of the cultural perspectives of others?03 
The criticisms targeted toward Charles Taylor's work in Multiculturalism and 
"The Politics of Recognition" are sound; however, the context in which they are 
presented must be examined. Steve C. Rockefeller's conclusions mirror liberalism's deep 
commitment to individual liberty and proceduralism, a perspective the openly clashes 
with Taylor's recognition of collective rights. By contrast, Michael Walzer's comments 
are more generous in that he finds cause for some agreement with Taylor's assertions. 
202 Ibid, p. 102 
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However, in the end Walzer and Taylor disagree as to the means and actual processes 
through which otherness should be acknowledged. Walzer comments that Taylor's 
choice of a more "open" liberalism is problematic in that is raises questions as to the 
degree to which government is responsible for the protection and survival of minority 
cultures. Walzer cites that in the United States, Taylor's ideal of cultural citizenship 
would be difficult to achieve.204 However Walzer, much like his communitarian 
counterpart Michael Sandel, addresses concerns regarding multiculturalism from an 
American perspective. Walzer is more than correct in his assessment that Taylor's notion 
of cultural citizenship rights would fail in the United States, however it should not be 
assumed that Taylor's particular understanding is intended to refer to the American 
experience. As a matter of fact, Walzer's suggestion that individual rights be balanced 
with a recognition of "otherness" closely models the original intentions proposed by 
Taylor in "The Politics of Recognition" and Saul in Reflections of a Siamese Dream: 
Canada at the End of the Twentieth Century. 
Theoretical debates engaged in by political scholars are often portrayed as being 
divisive, without any basis of common understanding. While differences exist between 
various theoretical perspectives, similar themes are often subtly articulated. Rockefeller, 
Taylor, Saul and Walzer approach the issue of citizenship rights from differing 
perspectives, however a commonality exists regarding their respective conceptions of 
justice. The aforementioned theorists are connected in that they do not exclusively deal 
with questions regarding citizenship in a purely normative sense, but rather attempt to 
204 Ibid, p. 102 
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deal with diversity in a real context. This is contrasted by the work of John Rawls or Iris 
Marion Young who primarily address the issues surrounding the distribution citizenship 
rights from a theoretical level (i.e. Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance"). For Charles Taylor, 
responding to the real needs of cultural actors requires the abandonment of theoretical 
extremes in that they do little to address political circumstances as they exist. Taylor's 
choice of a theoretical middle ground is not based on solely upon a concern for 
broadening the ranging of philosophical inquiry, but rather to address actual social 
conditions. As illustrated, actual political conditions rarely mirror the models 
constructed by such theorists as Iris Marion Young or John Rawls. While the work of 
these scholars is valid in its own right, theoretical extremes do little to address the 
distinct needs associated with actual circumstances. This issue is only subtly articulated 
by Charles Taylor, however it is also clearly identified by Ronald Beiner as well. 
5.5: Finding Equilibrium 
Scholars such as Young and Walzer, rather than constructing theoretical devices 
that attempt to negotiate between differentiated notions of citizenship, choose to endorse 
one extreme over another. However, for Beiner political theory, in any form, cannot 
exist on the periphery of theoretical debate; it must address the real and complex 
demands associated with contemporary notions of identity. Borrowing from the 
Canadian example, as Charles Taylor does, Beiner uses the example of the Quebec 
political experience to illustrated that political communities unconsciously attempt to 
negotiate between the boundaries of citizenship by developing social equilibriums. He 
writes, 
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Allowing myself now to speak freely in my Canadian voice I will call 
perspective No. I the "Pierre Trudeau" vision of citizenship ( with its 
uncompromising appeal to individual rights), and we can call perspective No.2 
the "Jacques Parizeau" vision of citizenship ( with its invocation of "old stock" 
Quebecois) I find both of these two accounts of citizenship radically deficient, 
but I lack the confidence that I can come up with a third perspective that 
supplies the deficiencies of No. 1 and No.2, and retains (in a higher synthesis) 
the strengths of each (relative to the other). The convincing "NO" that issued 
forth from the citizens of my political community in the 1992 referendum, 
some of whom voted for "Pierre Trudeau" reasons and some of whom voted no 
for "Jacques Parizeau" reasons, brings home to us in very concrete political 
fashion the difficultly of conceptualizing the experience of citizenship in a way 
that doesn't get drawn into the unhappy either/or enforced by the polarizing 
alternatives of perspectives Nos. 1 and .,,205 
For Beiner the obvious demand of contemporary theory is to address the complex 
identities of citizens as they really exist. It is entirely possible, as the example of Quebec 
illustrates, that cultural citizenship need not deny any notion of cultural identity nor 
belonging to a larger community. Beiner, in his lament against the self-set theoretical 
limitations of some political scholars, points out that the mass public does not limit its 
options in the process of defining citizenship. Actual pubic discourse is fluid; the public 
is conscious of the various political options available, yet they do not commit themselves 
fully to one extreme or another. The search for a theoretical/practical equilibrium 
between universalism and particularism is not merely a matter fuelled by intellectual 
curiosity, but rather it is a real social phenomenon. John Ralston Saul supports this 
perspective in his historical interpretation of Canada's continuous search for equilibrium. 
Saul comments that this balance between the needs of the individual and the common 
good requires a complex understanding of citizenship. He writes in Reflections of a 
Siamese Dream: Canada at the End of the Twentieth Century, 
205 Beiner, Theorizing Citizenship, p. 15 
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The assumption of complexity is a search for balance between different 
elements; not the eradication or domination of one over the others, but a 
continuing struggle to develop and maintain some sort of equilibrium.206 
While John Ralston Saul, Ronald Beiner, Charles Taylor and Fred Dallmayr 
endorse a highly developed and open public debate regarding citizenship rights, the 
actual process whereby that is carried out is fraught with potential conflicts. Building a 
consensus regarding citizenship rights has never been assumed to be an easy task in 
Canada. The notion of an activist state is advantageous in a culturally diverse nation, 
however this interventionist role can create conflict as well. While the state is proactive 
and accepts a leadership role, the popular will may differ from actual government policy 
initiatives that are designed to give voice, define and disseminate cultural citizenship 
rights .. The notion of a deliberative democracy seems an ideal mechanism for the 
development of a common good, however a final consensus may be difficult to achieve. 
Nowhere was this more evident than during the 1992 referendum concerning the 
Charlottetown Accord. In the case of the Charlottetown Accord, though a particular 
understanding of cultural citizenship did not gain public support, the process of public 
consultation should not be viewed as a failing of the communitarian project in Canada. It 
allowed Canadians to voice their opposition to a proposed notion of cultural citizenship 
that did not meet their needs or expectations. Political societies that possess these 
genuine mechanisms for democratic discussion must accept that public discourse may 
not always lead toward a final consensus regarding a definition of the common good. 
However, the aftermath surrounding the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord, and earlier 
. 206 Saul, p. 223 
109 
the Meech Lake Accord did reinforce the need for a broader national public discourse 
concerning citizenship rights. Harold D. Clarke et al., in Absent Mandate, write of this, 
The Spicer Commission (the Citizen's Forum on Canada's future), the 
Beaudion-Dobbie parliamentary committee, and the five weekend conferences 
all provide evidence not only of the citizens' dissatisfaction with that way that 
constitutional politics had been conducted, but also of the public's demand to 
be more involved. Calls for a constitutional convention, for a referendum, and 
for other mechanisms of poplar consultation were as much a part of the debate 
as were the specific of the constitutional design, which themselves included 
demands for more democratic institution,,207 
The path toward achieving a political equilibrium between competing values is 
not smooth, yet it is an essential element of nation building. 
Beiner, Taylor, Saul and Dallmayr respectfully illustrate that Canada occupies 
both a theoretical and pragmatic middleground in the discourse surrounding citizenship 
rights. However, while the authors provide a sound moral justification for a 
communitarian understanding of the Canadian political experience, it should not be 
assumed that Canadians are bound together through mere altruistic reasons. An element 
of pragmatism exists within the development of Canada as a nation. The very idea of 
Canada was conceived not through a passionately nationalist inspired mandate, but rather 
it served as a convenient vehicle for the preservation of cultural identities.208 
The modem notion of cultural citizenship emerged from the adoption of an 
official policy of multiculturalism in 1971, however tolerance of difference and the 
recognition of a moral need for cultural survival traces its roots to an earlier time. In pre-
Confederation Canada, the issue of cultural accommodation was viewed as political 
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necessity in order to ensure political stability. The' idea of the Canadian nation is based 
on practical reasoning. Canada, at its formation, was primarily composed of British and 
French cultural groups. Both these founding groups expressed some degree of concern 
regarding the potential assimilation of the continent into an American empire. As a result 
a common concern was shared between these two distinct cultural groups in an attempt to 
maintain their respective collective cultural identities and corresponding citizenship 
rights. David Bell and Lome Tepperman write in The Roots of Disunity of this unique 
situation, 
... aspect of the BNA Act were indirectly addressed to the question of Anglo-
French relations, and formed a part of the tacit bargain ... the old province of 
Canada was split into Quebec and Ontario, the one province mainly French-
speaking, the other English speaking ... For the Francophones, a federal union 
offered the best choice among several imperfect alternatives. Chiefly, it 
allowed Lower Canada to "preserve its autonomy together with all the 
institutions it held so dear". Also it gave 'to Lower Canada the local 
government of its own affairs, and the control of all matters relating to its 
institutions, to its laws, to its religion, its manufactures and its autonomy.209 
Continuing with their analysis, Bell and Tepperman suggest that monarchical 
institutions acted as a counterbalance to the strictly liberal homogenizing values 
espoused by American republicanism,z1O Where Francophones perceived Confederation 
as a means of cultural survival, Anglophones also viewed the American project with 
suspicion. Though a common language and culture was shared between Americans and 
Anglophones in Upper Canada, distinct ideological differences abounded to the extent 
209 Bell and Tepperman, p. 122 
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that any umon with the United States was viewed unfavourably.211 This notion of 
umbrella citizenship has allowed for vanous cultural groups, aside from just 
Anglophones and Francophones, to exist and flourish in Canada. The result of this 
formative process is that the common good is defined in terms of a collective sense of 
purpose, that being cultural survival While cultural differences exist, a tacit 
understanding has grown that acknowledges that the state could provide the means and 
mechanisms through which cultural survival could be best assured. This notion of 
guiding common purpose is articulated not only through such policy vehicles as official 
multiculturalism, but also public policies that do not directly deal with cultural matters, 
such as universal access to healthcare. 
The insight that David Bell and Lome Tepperman provide allow for an 
understanding of the historical basis whereby which the dissemination of cultural 
citizenship rights can be examined. Bell and Tepperman, along with Charles Taylor, 
John Ralston Saul and Ronald Beiner, view the Canadian political experience as a 
middleground between universalist principles and notions of particularism. However, at 
the same time Canada can still be labelled as conforming to a communitarianism 
perspective. This understanding may seen curious, in that both Beiner and Taylor 
suggest that communitarianism exists as a theoretical extreme rather than a perspective 
that attempts to create an equilibrium. Furthermore, as Beiner and Taylor point out, 
Canadian political culture and institutions are influenced to some degree by the 
proceduralism associated with liberal interpretations of justice. From this perspective, it 
211 Ibid, p. 63-4 
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might be justified to label the Canadian experience as being more liberal rather than 
communitarian in nature. However, the key distinction that allows Canada to be 
understood from a communitarian perspective is that as a whole Canada exhibits key 
collectivist tendencies, an aspect of political culture that is not emphasized by liberal 
political values. Furthermore a Canadian communitarian perspective does not reject 
liberalism outright, but rather endorses greater focus upon the collective good within the 
scope of liberal-democratic institutions. This particular understanding must be qualified 
in that certain communitarians, such as Michael Sandel, place a greater focus on the 
common good than individual rights. This extreme form of communitarianism, as Beiner 
and Taylor might term it, has never developed popular nor political appeal in Canada. 
Sandel's notion of community focuses primarily on small-scale communities and 
localized 10yalties?12 This is directly contrasted by the Canadian example in which an 
emphasis on collective goals has traditionally been viewed as national in scale, expressed 
through broad collectivist-oriented ideologies of democratic socialism and conservative 
Toryism?13 While early liberals in Canada espoused classical liberal values, over time 
Canadian liberalism has become more collectivity orientated as well. Pressures to 
commit to one philosophical extreme or another, asserts Taylor, can be balanced by a 
strong commitment to safeguard the fundamental rights of individual and cultural groups 
by both government and the public at large. Canada is by nature a nation of extremes, 
cultural or otherwise. To this end it has adopted a political and ideological model that 
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attempts to balance differences in the effort to develop an understanding of the common 
good. However such assessments, both historical and contemporary, have been labelled 
at times mere surface examinations. 
Scholars such as Michael Walzer and Iris Marion Young point out that the 
Canadian model is plagued with theoretical contradictions. A recognition of cultural 
citizenship may be morally justified, yet may not be practically applicable. While the 
Canadian communitarian project does seem to function well, its history is marked by 
cultural conflicts as well, the obvious example being the separatist cause in Quebec. It 
would be erroneous to assume that while a strong democratic and deliberative tradition 
exists within Canada, cultural tensions are easily dealt with. Questions linger as to the 
exact process and criteria upon which cultural citizenship rights are to be distributed. It 
is vital to examine the exact means and institutional mechanisms that allow for the 
continued stability of the Canadian political system, yet allow for the management of 
internal cultural conflicts. It is this comprehension that is key in understanding the 
Canadian communitarian experience and how it has proceeded to nurture a democratic 
civic culture. 
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Chapter Six 
Building a Just Community: 
Understanding the Boundaries of Canadian Communitarianism 
The search for a balance between universal and particular regimes of citizenship 
rights has attracted much attention from the academic community. In particular, the 
discourse concerning citizenship rights includes numerous theoretical paradigms that 
attempt to incorporate an element of social pluralism. However, debate continues among 
scholars as to the degree to which cultural citizenship rights should be recognized. John 
Rawls and Iris Marion Young choose to commit themselves to one "extreme" perspective 
or another, however this choice is not always embraced by their respective colleagues. 
Scholars such as Charles Taylor and Ronald Beiner attempt to search out a third 
alternative, a middle ground between philosophical extremes. In the process of 
developing a theoretical equilibrium, Canada is cited as a tangible example of the 
pragmatic adoption of a balanced rights discourse.214 While cultural citizenship rights 
are recognized by government, and actively promoted, it is not to the detriment of 
fundamental individual freedoms. It is clear that the Canadian model does not conform 
to traditional liberal principles of difference-blind justice, rather it includes a form of 
ethnic pluralism. The Canadian experience matches more closely the communitarian 
model in that it possesses a collectivist political culture that attempts to address cultural 
citizenship issues through an active and open public discourse. Social difference is 
viewed in Canada as a key element in nation-building To this end, the accommodation 
214 Beiner, Theorizing Citizenship, p. 15 
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of cultural differences has become an integral aspect of the Canadian psyche and is 
clearly articulated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Meech Lake 
and Charlottetown Accords, the rise of the Bloc Quebecois and the Multiculturalism Act 
of 1971 all point to a society in which cultural expression is left to neither the public nor 
the private realm, but an essential component of Canadian civic culture. 
5.1 Setting the Criteria for Cultural Citizenship Rights 
Liberalism is appealing in that it provides a convenient tool through which rights 
can be determined and distributed; universal principles allow for an all-encompassing 
and ever-enduring regime of citizenship rights. However, while liberalism provides a 
simple formula for the dissemination of citizenship rights, communitarian scholars 
question the notion that one ideal of citizenship satisfies the needs of all citizens. 
Communitarianism suggests that differentiated forms of citizenship rights serve the needs 
of distinct social actors best. While the moral value of such a recognition is valid, certain 
issues remain as to how cultural citizenship rights can be disseminated and protected. 
Scholars such as Charles Taylor emphasize the capacity of the body politic to discuss 
cultural citizenship rights, however the legal guarantees of such rights are solely the 
dominion of the state. 
With the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada 
committed itself to the institutions of liberal proceduralism, yet the products of this 
system have reflected Canada's commitment to the process substantive justice. The 
marriage between liberal inspired institutional mechanisms and a communitarian political 
culture may seem a political oddity in that it does not conform to any traditional 
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understanding of the rights· discourse. However, this arrangement has served 
successfully in that while cultural tensions have and do exist, Canada has avoided serious 
civil conflict as experienced by other multi-ethnic states. It is evident that in the process 
of recognizing cultural citizenship rights, the institutions of democracy can function 
effectively. However, while this perspective has been endorsed by many scholars such as 
Charles Taylor, David Bell, Lome Tepperman and Fred Dallmayr, the actual process of 
distributing cultural citizenship rights is complex. While purely liberal states emphasize 
the ideal of individual liberty, Canada must balance the rights of the individual with that 
of cultural group identities. Often they conflict with each other and as a result Canada 
must have certain criteria to fairly and justly distribute rights. While it is understood that 
multiple forms of citizenship rights benefit Canadians as a whole, real and actual criteria 
must exist as to which rights take precedence in any given situation. The process through 
which this occurs can be best understood through an actual example of jurisprudence. 
In recent decades, First Nations Peoples have openly articulated their particular 
cultural interests on the political scene. Aboriginal Canadians have faced pressures to 
develop a clear delineation concerning the scope and limits of cultural citizenship rights 
for First Nation peoples. However, at times cultural citizenship rights clash with the 
rights of others and, as a result, competing regimes of citizenship rights emerge. This 
issue is best illustrated by the 1992 British Columbia Supreme Court case, Thomas v. 
Norris, in which David Thomas, an Aboriginal, was forced to participate in a tradition 
known as the Spirit Dance. By custom the Coast Salish People, to which Thomas 
belonged, had members of their community participate in this ritual whether their 
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involvement was voluntary or not. Eventually Thomas sued the band for assault and 
false imprisonment after he was forced to participate in the Spirit Dance.215 This 
instance creates a dichotomy in that Aboriginals are considered, under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a cultural minority and as such are granted certain legal 
considerations in order to protect their respective cultural institutions. The rift illustrated 
through Thomas v. Norris is a manifestation of a condition greater than one particular 
legal challenge. It forces the need to set specific criteria as to what extent the cultural 
citizenship rights of First Nations People should be distributed. In regard to the 
aforementioned case, the court upheld the right of the Coast Salish People to continue 
their cultural traditions, however the act of forcing an involuntary person to participate in 
these traditions was not a central tenant of Salish culture. Thus, David Thomas' rights as 
an individual were upheld in that he did not strongly identify himself with the Coast 
Salish People; as an individual Thomas made a clear distinction between his individual 
identity and his Aboriginal ancestry.216 It is key to note that the final decision of the 
British Columbia Supreme Court is nuanced and based on the particulars of this case. 
The decision cannot be read to be indicative of any limitations put on the cultural 
citizenship rights of First Nation peoples. While a specific conflict between persons was 
resolved in the case of Thomas v. Norris, there is still a continuous struggle concerning 
individual or group-oriented rights. Overall, Canadian jurisprudence has not developed a 
specific set of criteria whereby which the boundaries of cultural citizenship can be 
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clearly outlined. Rather, the Canadian courts have not sought out clear and universal 
boundaries of citizenship, but rather have created a "fuzzy" and malleable understanding 
of rights based on prevailing public standards and interpretations of the components of 
citizenship. A vigail Eisenberg comments on this situation in "Individual and Group 
Difference in Canadian Jurisprudence". She writes, 
The notion of difference suggests that conflicting claims can be compared by 
scrutinizing the evidence regarding the role of the practice being disputed in a 
group's way of life and, in the Thomas case, the role of the community in the 
individuals life. No general argument is found in either the counsel arguments 
or the courts' decisions regarding the importance of collective or individual 
rights per se. Instead, the general argument informing these decisions in 
predicated upon identity and upon using the provisions of the Constitutions to 
protect individual and group difference.217 
This pattern in Canadian jurisprudence highlights the role of Canada's institutions 
in the attempt to create and deliver a set of universal principle of justice. The idea of 
differentiated citizenship rights must acknowledge that each situation differs in context 
and complexity and, as a result, decisions regarding citizenship rights differ as well. A 
liberal conception of justice would find this situation perplexing in that it blurs the idea 
of citizenship, however it does conform to a communitarian notion of justice. 
Communitarian ideals of justice are by nature particularistic, each focusing on a specific 
situation and are open to the on-going evolution of a community's interpretation of 
boundaries of citizenship rights. However, while Thomas v. Norris provides an example 
as to how the criteria for cultural citizenship rights are to be distributed, it is an isolated 
example. The particulars of the case are important, the process by which this decision 
217 Ibid,p.19 
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was made is of most importance. No legal precedent existed prior to this case. However 
once the decision was made, it was made clear in the judgment that the decision of the 
British Columbia Supreme Court was based on the facts of the case; it was not intended 
to provide a means of delineating between all competing notions of citizenship. 
Consequently, the criteria in the distribution of cultural citizenship are particular to each 
case. 
The issue brought forth by Thomas v Norris points out that cultural citizenship 
rights are debated throughout the institutions of the state. However, in a broader scope 
the products of substantive justice create situation specific and fluid regimes of 
citizenship. These particularistic regimes of citizenship rights do little to further the 
process of nation-building. The case of Thomas v. Norris was connected to a notion of 
cultural citizenship rights outlined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; 
however, questions remain concerning the cultural citizenship rights of non-Charter 
Canadians. Where do they fit in the general discourse surrounding citizenship right? Do 
the rights of a individual outweigh that of a Doukhobour community in Saskatchewan? 
In the last few decades a certain number of such ambiguous legal issues have coine to the 
public consciousness. Often the clash is between that of the public good and the rights of 
a community or individual to cultural expression. For instance, in recent years there has 
been a controversy regarding the allowance of Sikhs to carry kirpans, ceremonial 
daggers, in a public school setting. A concern existed that the kirpans would be used as 
weapons, though baptized Sikhs were prohibited by custom from removing the dagger 
from its holster expect during ceremonial occasions. While not a Charter cultural group, 
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the cultural rights of Sikhs are guaranteed through Canada's emphasis on cultural 
survival as a fundamental human rights. Many persecuted people, including Sikhs, have 
immigrated to Canada for the very reason that Canada is highly tolerant of cultural 
difference. This obvious clash of values found its way to the Ontario Human Rights 
Commission which ruled that Sikhs did indeed have the right to carry kirpans if the 
dagger was properly secured and the appropriate public school authorities informed.2Is 
While this decision existed outside the realm of the Canadian judicial system, it 
illustrates the Canadians are capable of deliberating upon competing notions of the 
citizenship rights. 
In the discussion of the limits and boundaries of citizenship rights, it is evident 
that while effective public mechanisms exist to deliberate upon and distribute cultural 
citizenship rights fairly, a debate continues to endure regarding the limits of any such 
rights. The acknowledgment of social diversity also carries with it a recognition that 
political institutions must be open to change; justice must respond to particular 
circumstances and the changing needs and perceptions of social actors and society as a 
whole. Overall, regimes of cultural citizenship in Canada should not be defined in terms 
of creating a final set of boundaries or formal legal criteria, but rather as an active social 
process. The building of a common good is best understood not as the clear development 
and articulation of citizenship rights, but rather the deliberative process through which 
citizenship rights are discussed and considered. This model has allowed Canadians to 
openly address the changing needs of cultural actors. As a result, the notion of cultural 
218 Fleras and Elliot, p. 210 
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citizenship has evolved from an understanding of "Two Solitudes" to that of multicultural 
and bilingual society.219 The continuous demographic shift that the Canadian population 
finds itself facing, thorough immigration and newly recognized modes of citizenship, 
requires a certain degree of fluidity. Furthermore, questions concerning cultural 
citizenship are not merely deliberated upon in Canada's formal institutions, but also occur 
at the civic level. 
6.2 Mechanisms of Public Deliberation 
While formal public institutions play a crucial role in the discourse surrounding 
the boundaries of cultural citizenship rights, civic actors play a key role as well. The 
recognition of diversity in Canada does not take place solely at an institutional level; a 
larger social process takes place as well. Seyla Benhabib suggests open communication 
is a requirement for the construction of an active and meaningful process of collective 
decision-making and the mediation of social conflict. Benhabib suggests that even in the 
most democratic societies different conceptions of the good life will surface. As a result 
mechanisms are needed to discuss these abundant points of view. The author does not 
reject traditional forms of interest articulation associated with liberal-democracy such as 
political parties and elected legislatures, however these should be complemented by a 
"plurality of modes of association" .220 Benhabib writes, 
(a) model of democracy does not need to operate with the function of a general 
deliberative assembly in that the procedure specifications of this model 
privilege a plurality of modes of association in which all affected can have the 
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right to articulate their point of view. These can range from political parties, to 
citizens' initiatives, to social movements, to voluntary associations, to 
consciousness-raising groups, and the like. It is through the interlocking net of 
these multiple forms of associations, networks, and organizations that an 
anonymous "public conversation" results. It is central to the model of 
deliberative democracy that it privileges such a public sphere of mutually 
interlocking and overlapping networks and associations of deliberation, 
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contestIOn an argumentatIOn. 
The openness to difference and opinion associated with the Canadian condition 
allows for a frank social discourse to emerge regarding the issue of cultural protections. 
This is evident throughout Canada's political history; the recognition of differentiated 
cultural citizenship rights has been made both through formal institutions and tacit social 
contracts. Charles Taylor, who suggests that the decision-making capacity of formal 
institutions is merely an extension of the capacity of a society to reach consensus, also 
alludes to this notion. Taylor asserts that the deliberative mechanisms that exist at a 
deeper civic level fuel formal institutional processes. He suggests that any mature 
democracy is obligated to consider all points of view in developing a conception of the 
good life.222 Any society of diverse peoples and diverse opinions must develop some sort 
of consensus that includes the respective needs and opinions or all actors, not only those 
directly involved. He writes in "Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?)", 
A democratic state is constantly facing new questions, and in addition aspires 
to form a consensus on the questions that it has to decide, not merely to reflect 
the outcome of diffuse opinion. However, a decision emerging from joint 
deliberation does not merely require everybody to vote according to his or her 
opinion. It is also necessary that each person's opinion should have been able to 
take shape or be reformed in the light of discussion - that is to say, by exchange 
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with others. This necessarily implies a degree of cohesion. To some extent, 
the members must know one another, listen to another, and understanding one 
another.223 
Taylor, in removing his analysis from a form of proceduralism associated with 
traditional liberalism, suggests that a common bond is required amongst citizens if the 
democratic process is to be carried out to its logical end. The emphasis on collectivity, 
and concern for the needs of others, is consistent with communitarian principles. It is 
only through a deeper understanding of the bonds of community that the notion of 
democratic government can function smoothly and effectively. Taylor suggests that the 
complexities of personal identity and cultural citizenship requires a strong conscious 
commitment among political actors to further their mutual interests, regardless of the 
respective difference. Taylor writes of the commitment: 
... a modem democratic states demands a "people" with a strong collective 
identity. Democracy obliges us to show much more solidarity and much more 
commitment to one another in our joint political project than was demanded by 
the hierarchical and authoritarian societies ofyesteryear?24 
The argument Charles Taylor forwards articulates the need for a collectivity to 
address mutual civic concerns in moving forward the democratic project. If a society 
such as Canada commits itself to openly recognizing cultural difference, it must also 
have public mechanisms through which competing notions of the good life can be 
deliberated upon. This key aspect of Canadian political culture meets the expectations of 
many communitarians as well. While liberalism merely recognizes the equal moral 
worth of each individual, communitarians goes further in that it allows for an 
223 Ibid, p. 270 
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acknowledgment of the equal moral worth of each culture along with appropriate 
mechanisms to guarantee such rights. While Benhabib comments on the complexity of 
the deliberative process in distributing citizenship rights, Taylor extends this discussion 
by commenting on several obstacles that an open deliberative process creates. While on a 
theoretical basis Benhabib' s and Taylor's arguments are well justified, it creates 
difficulties in the practical implementation of such wide ranging discourse. This model 
outlines a social and political process of deliberation, yet it does not clearly articulate any 
real consensus regarding a conception of the good life. 
Charles Taylor, in Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", outlines 
the moral justification for the recognition of cultural citizenship rights by the state. 
However, Taylor himself is cognizant of the fact that a departure from the traditional 
liberal framework does create theoretical and practical problems for not only the state, 
but also the polity as a whole. In particular, while cultural rights may be designed to 
respond to the distinct needs of threatened cultural minorities, such cultural guarantees 
may infringe upon the rights of other groups. Scholars such as Taylor and Beiner suggest 
that maintaining a balance between conflicting cultural citizenship rights is by no means 
an easy task to accomplish. In their respective writings they outline a need to move 
political theory and rights discourse as a whole away· from existing philosophical 
extremes. This issue is discussed in some respects by Charles Taylor in "Democratic 
Exclusion (and Its Remedies)" in which he discusses the issue using the example of 
Quebec. Taylor writes that while most Canadians do agree with the need "to promote 
and protect Quebec distinct character", in the end the Meech Lake Accord did not 
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achieve the popular support of a majority of Canadians.225 In particular, many 
Anglophones in Quebec viewed this as a unilateral endorsement of a primarily 
Francophone society in the province. This sentiment is not to be viewed as a complete 
rej ection of Quebec's need for cultural survival, but rather a verdict that censured the 
process through which the Meech Lake Accord was conceived. The actual provisions of 
the Accord were planned and designed by the nation's First Ministers, with little public 
consultation. For Taylor, a purely procedural process is doomed to fail in Canada, as are 
any formal guarantees of citizenship rights, if no wide ranging public discourse is 
incorporated.226 The needs of one cultural group directly effect the status of all others, as 
evidenced by the case of Anglophones in Quebec. 
6.3 Mediating Cultural Conflicts 
While Taylor openly endorses the need for cultural survival, such an 
endorsement must also be balanced with a healthy respect and protection for the rights of 
the others. This situation, as Taylor often alludes to, is exemplified by Quebec's attempt 
to secure a place for the French language in Quebecois society. While this need for 
cultural survival is a reasonable aspiration, considering Quebec's location in a primarily 
Anglophone North America, it has caused a great deal of controversy in the decades 
succeeding the Quiet Revolution. 
The political articulation of the distinct needs of French-speaking Quebecers 
developed popular appeal with the ascendancy of the Parti Quebecois. The party itself is 
fully committed to gaining independence; it has always endorsed legislation that has 
225 Ibid, p. 269 
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promoted the use of the French language. Quebec's Bill 101, for instance, limits non-
French language commercial sign usage, and is viewed by many as reasonable in that its 
aim is to preserve the use of French. However, while most Canadians would agree with 
the need to preserve the French culture, linguistic minorities in Quebec have suggested 
that such mechanisms violate their right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by 
Section 2(b) of the Charter. This issue has surfaced in front of the courts on several 
occasions, when the government of Quebec has invoked the Notwithstanding Clause in 
order to override the Charter. In the past, the obvious resolution to this contentious 
situation has been to address this conflict between cultural and individual rights at the 
formal constitutional level, however such attempts have been met with failure in recent 
years. The Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords attempted to reduce this clear 
conflict, however to date no resolution has been found. The issue of the survival of the 
French language in Quebec has been heated, however it extends beyond this mere issue 
of group rights versus the interests of the individual. 
The issue of language and the protection of linguistic minorities has always been 
an issue of political saliency since Confederation. However, the evolution of Canada 
from a notion of itself as a nation of "Two Solitudes" to that of a multicultural society 
has caused some friction between Canada's historically dominant cultural groups. While 
the notion of multiculturalism has been seen by a great majority of Canadians as a means 
of social and political inclusion in the process of nation building, such a conception of 
social justice has been viewed by Francophones as a threat to the predominance of the 
French culture. The political values of Quebec have traditionally been based on a 
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sentiment of La Survivance, a need to survive in the wake of an Anglophone dominated 
continent. Quebec has never accepted the form of cultural pluralism that 
multiculturalism espouses.227 By contrast Quebec has adopted a subtle policy of 
integration, acculturating non-Francophones to the French language and recruiting 
immigrants from predominantly French speaking nations in the Caribbean and Africa. 
This resistance to the social and political value system endorsed by a conception of 
multiculturalism is discussed further by David Bell and Lome Tepperman in The Roots 
of Disunity. They write, 
... Quebec Francophones have almost always thought that ethnic diversity 
threatened their rights. Francophones are part of the Canadian Mosaic, but 
they do not accept the mosaic in either principle or proactive. They resent its 
implications of equal status for all minority cultures, especially since most of 
the other minorities have chosen to learn English, the dominant language. 
Francophones support for multiculturalism at the time of confederation gave 
way to a belief in the principle of two cultures, or biculturalism: Francophones 
insisted on special status as of the two "founding races." They have not 
reversed their opinion in the years that have intervened.228 
The case of Quebec is of particular interest in that it extends beyond a mere 
conflict between the particular goals of one cultural group and the rights of individuals is 
a stark rejection the values of toleration and accommodation that have become the 
hallmark of Canadian multiculturalism. This sharp division may be viewed as a direct 
reputation of Taylor's notion of a deliberative democracy that is capable in negotiating 
between competing cultural interests. It must be noted that while direct differences exist 
in core political values between Quebecois political culture and the values of Canadian 
227 Fleras and Elliott, p. 83 
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multiculturalism, communitarian sympathizers, such as Taylor, would suggest that a key 
commonality exists as well. While it is evident that conflicts exist, there is a tacit 
agreement between both "nations" that any debate be conducted through deliberative and 
public discourse. While other culturally conflicted nations, such as the former 
Yugoslavia or Rwanda, have disintegrated in civil war, a strong commitment to the 
democratic process exists in Canada. Regardless of any differences concerning the 
actual substance of the debate, there is agreement concerning the process through which 
public discussion is to be carried out. 
6.4 Whither the Communitarian Project? 
The virtues associated with communitarianism have attracted its critics 
throughout the years. The fact of the matter is that the success of communitarian project 
faces doubts in some academic circles in that it leaves open many questions concerning 
the exact criteria through which cultural citizenship rights are to be disseminated. This 
point is even echoed by Charles Taylor himself. He writes in Multiculturalism and "The 
Politics of Recognition", 
Here is another severe problem with much of the politics of multiculturalism. 
The peremptory demand for favour judgments of worth is paradoxically -
perhaps one should say tragically - homogenizing. For it implies that we 
already have the standards to make such judgments. The standard we have are 
that of the North America civilization .... There is perhaps after all a moral issue 
here ... What it requires above all is an admission that we are very far away from 
that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might 
be evident. This would mean breaking with an illusion that still holds many 
"multiculturalists -as well as their most bitter opponents -in its grip229 
229 Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", p. 73 
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Taylor's concluding remarks in Multiculturalism and "The Politics of 
Recognition" suggest that perhaps a final end may not necessarily be forth coming in the 
quest to define the boundaries of citizenship. It is upon this point that Charles Taylor 
departs from his colleagues. Political theorists such as John Rawls, Iris Marion Young, 
Michael Walzer and Michael Sandel assume there is a presumed end with regard to 
understanding the demands and limits of cultural citizenship rights. Even John Ralston 
Saul, the champion of creating a balance between competing interpretations of the public 
good, suggests that the public interest is rapidly being scaled back as a result of "our rush 
to decentralization". He continues by suggesting that the focus on the public good in 
Canada is "being transformed into little more than an alliance of powers and interests" by 
a multitude of self-interested actors?30 This perspective is shared somewhat by Taylor, 
who suggests that the search for a clear and distinct of understanding of citizenship, 
cultural or otherwise, fails in that it cannot accurately address the complexity of the 
numerous contemporary understandings of the good life. Furthermore, even if a clear 
understanding of citizenship could be deliberated upon, it must be eventually discarded 
as society evolves and social needs change. While some attempts have been made to 
define the boundaries of citizenship in Canada, as evidenced by Will Kymlicka's 
understanding of the "multination" and "polyethnic" citizenship, the lines still remain 
blurry?31 However for Taylor, the success of the democratic project is based in the 
ability of a nation to actively acknowledge citizenship and, more importantly, undergo a 
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continuous process of moral self-examination. This process allows cultural actors to give 
voice to their distinct needs and concerns, even if no real consensus is reached as to what 
rights are to be distributed and to what extent. Such a capacity is vacant in traditional 
liberal democratic models that endorse a universal regime of citizenship rights. It is also 
empty in the type of Americanized communitarianism endorsed by Michael Sandel. The 
communitarian project in Canada can be deemed a success in that the common good is 
understood as the ability of a deliberative process to engage Canadians to clearly 
articulate their respective needs concerning cultural citizenship. 
The ideal that Taylor forwards is valid, however much of his writing is based 
within the Canadian context. While Canada displays many communitarian virtues such 
as capacity for open deliberation and a toleration of difference, other nations are not as 
fortunate. Throughout the Western world issues concerning cultural citizenship have 
moved to the forefront of the political agenda, yet many nations have less capacity to 
deal with the emerging demands of cultural citizenship than Canada. In certain European 
countries the idea of recognizing differentiated cultural citizenship rights has become 
equated with a form of social welfare. Keith G. Banting suggests in "Social Citizenship 
and the Multicultural Welfare State" that the ideological and economic structures of 
some European nations are unable adequately address the rights of new immigrants. 
Consequently, second class citizens are created. Banting writes, 
... European countries do revel in some elements of welfare chauvinism. This 
reaction can take two forms: restrictive immigration policy, designed to 
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prevent foreigners coming into the country ... and restrictive benefit policy, 
designed to deny resident foreigners access to benefits.232 
Banting goes on to point out the deconstruction of Europe's ethnic homogeneity 
has led to the rise of many radical right wing parties that actively and openly advocate for 
ethnically homogenous nation-states.233 This is an aspect that Charles Taylor never fully 
exammes. While he rallies against the moral neutrality of states in the recognition of 
cultural citizenship, proactivity by the state can also take the form of negating cultural 
citizenship rights entirely. Some neo-liberal parties have rejected outright the principle 
associated with the liberal project by adopting "strains of authoritarianism" and antistate 
populism?34 By comparison the stress placed upon the Canadian polity pales in 
comparison to those faced by France or Germany. In part this can be explained by the 
fact that Canadian has never adopted a prevailing cultural identity; is has always been 
multiethnic to some extent. Banting continues by examining the American condition. 
While diversity is acknowledged to some extent in the United States, cultural 
citizenship rights are at times negated in that they are inordinately tied to economic 
rights. The needs of cultural actors are often dismissed in that they are masked by the 
thin guise of economic welfare issues. Keith Banting writes of this situation, 
The United States illustrates the most potent cocktail of neo-liberalism and 
welfare chauvinism. Racial attitudes remain the most important source of 
opposition to welfare among the white population. Republican electoral 
campaigns in the 1980s on the unpopularity of programs associated with poor 
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black people, and the party reaped major electoral gains among white union 
members, urban ethnics and southerners, creating the political room for 
significant cuts to social programs, especially those with disproportionately 
minority clientele.235 
It is evident that the notion of cultural citizenship shared by Canadians differs 
from that of many other nation-states throughout the world. However, it should not be 
assumed that Canada is immune from such patterns. Canada too has oppressed its 
cultural minorities, as evidenced by the impoverished living conditions of many 
Aboriginal communities. Furthermore, resistance emerged to Canada's official policy of 
bilingualism when it was initially introduced. In spite of this, Canada exists as an 
exception when compared to other liberal welfare states.236 Banting further writes of the 
Canadian condition, 
Moreover, a backlash against multiculturalism helped to launch the new Reform 
Party, a populist, neo-conservative party based in the western part of the 
country ... As the party has become more established, it has struggled to mute the 
strains of ethnocentrism in its ranks, and its parliamentary caucus now includes a 
number of people of colour. 237 
Banting's key thesis revolves around the notion that with the decentralization of 
the states, cultural citizenship rights have become threatened, a perspective shared by 
John Ralston Saul as well. Saul points to the emergence of an American model ofliberal 
interest articulation, de-emphasizing the common good.238 For a society to be truly 
inclusive, it must allow the full and equal participation of all its members in the 
institutions and broader civic life of the state. 
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It is clear that issues surrounding cultural citizenship have begun to dominate 
throughout the world. More and more, conflicts concerning cultural citizenship have 
replaced historical ideological conflicts, as suggested by Francis Fukuyama. What 
remains to be seen is the means and mechanisms through which these new and emerging 
cultural conflicts are to be deliberated upon. Virginia Leary suggests that no real 
international consensus exists as to how cultural citizenship rights are to be debated, let 
alone, distributed.239 However Leary asserts that The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights is a strong beginning. She writes in "Citizenship, Human Rights, and Diversity", 
The conception that all people have basic human rights is founded on the 
principle of equal dignity of each individual regardless of race, colour, 
nationality, or ethnic origin. As a principle, it is, and must, remain, in my 
view, a universal and protected principle of the international community. At 
the same time, it must be recognized that rights important to particular 
individuals or groups that have not yet been recognized internationally may be 
added to the list of internationally recognized human rights over time. The list 
of internationally protected human rights will not remain static. Moreover, 
conflicting interpretations of particular international standards will always exist 
without undermining the basic conception of the university of human rights.24o 
Leary, in her comments, echoes Charles Taylor's assertions that any conception of 
citizenship rights cannot remain stagnant in that the demands of citizenship are ever 
evolving. However, as Taylor has also noted before, the notion of cultural citizenship 
rights has come under attack as well. Often the phrase "cultural relativism" has been 
employed to negate any conception ofthe value of cultural citizenship rights.241 Within 
the larger scope of political discourse, it is more than evident that traditional conceptions 
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of citizenship have been eroded by contemporary social demands. However, many 
nations have not dealt with these internal stresses as well as Canada has. Many European 
nations have fought struggles against neo-liberal ideologues that wish to legally re-
emphasize the cultural homogeneity of a particular nation. Other nations have fallen 
victim to violent social conflicts as evidenced by political situations of Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia. By contrast Canada, has faired well in that while cultural conflicts 
continue to exist, an active commitment has been made to debate and recognize cultural 
. citizenship rights which is based on the historical necessity to do so. It is perhaps on this 
point that communitarian project can be deemed a success in Canada. In a greater global 
context that is in flux and open to mass migration, the political characteristics associated 
with the Canadian political experience are well developed to endure newly emerging 
potential cultural stresses. Canada's historic collectivist tendencies, coupled with a focus 
on recognizing internal difference, has allowed it to weather the radical ideological 
deconstruction faced by many Western nations. The underlying triumph of the Canadian 
political experience is based in the fact that it possesses a civic culture that is able to cope 
with shifts to the social fabric and overall views difference as a national resource. 
However, it should not be assumed that the demands of citizenship do not exert a toll on 
the nation, as evidenced by the never ceasing questions concerning Quebec's status 
within Canada. Yet, even this example illustrates the capacity of Canadians to deal with 
difference. While differences abound regarding the cultural citizenship rights of 
Quebecois, political deliberations are open and democratic. Without such outlets, 
institutional or otherwise, a real potential exists for violent social conflict. 
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The Canadian example is, however, an exception to the rule. It should not be 
assumed that the model that Canadians enjoy can be exported to other nations. The 
communitarian project is successful in Canada in that the elements of a functional civic 
culture have been cultivated and nurtured throughout a gradual historical evolution. 
Charles Taylor suggests that while Canada may have found a means through which 
differentiated regimes of citizenship rights can be negotiated, other nations cannot follow 
the Canadian example so easily. Taylor suggests if Western nations are to exist as 
functional democratic entities they must uncover their own particular "coping 
mechanisms" to deal with the sometimes contentious issues surrounding cultural 
citizenship. He writes in "Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies), 
Solutions have to be tailored to the particular situations. Some of the political 
mechanisms of this sharing are already well known, e.g., various brands of 
federalism as well as the design of forms of special status for minority society, 
such we see today in Scotland and Catalonia. But many other modalities 
remain to be devised for the still more diverse democratic societies of the 
twenty-first century. In the meantime, it will have helped, I believe, if we can 
perceive more clearly and starkly the nature of our· democratic dilemma, since 
the hold of unreal and a- historical solutions over our minds and imagination is 
still crippling our efforts to deal with the growing conflicts that arise from it.242 
Taylor points out in his description of the current state of the discourse 
surrounding citizenship rights, that an ideological vacuum has developed. With the 
deconstruction of traditional regimes of citizenship rights, no real philosophical 
successor has emerged. In part this is credited to the fact that solutions must be 
particular to the needs of each society. Consequently it is the responsibility of citizens 
themselves to negotiate what mechanisms and understandings of justice serve their 
242 Taylor, "Democratic Exclusion (and its Remedies), p. 286 
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society the best. The communitarian project in Canada can only be counted as one of 
many potential paradigms that exist to address the demands associated with citizenship. 
In light of the perspective provided by such scholars as Taylor, Banting and 
Leary, the traditional subjects of academic inquiry, such as the "Liberal-Communitarian 
Debate" seem lacking in proposing a solution to the current situation faced by many 
nations. The highly abstract ideas of justice, equality and liberty may not speak to the 
real needs of citizens. Anne Phillips writes of this issue in "Dealing with Difference: A 
Politics of Ideas or a Politics of Presence?", 
.. the biggest mistake is to set up ideas as the opposite of presence: to treat ideas 
totally separate from people who carry them; or worry exclusively about the 
people without giving a though to their policies or ideas ... What is, perhaps, 
emerging is that the more satisfactory ways of redressing group exclusion are 
those that are less-group-specific ... mechanisms should be-and can be-devised 
that address the problems of group exclusion without fixing the boundaries or 
character of each group.243 
Phillips suggests that "free-market" democracy no longer can adequately address 
the diverse needs of social actors. Phillips continues by stating, "We can no longer 
pretend that the full range of ideas and preferences and alternatives has been adequately 
represented when these charged with the job of reprehensions are all white or all male or 
all middle-class" ?44 The idea of particular justice is sound, however appropriate formal 
and informal mechanisms must be designed to allow a diversity of social actors the 
opportunity to develop a commonly held understanding of citizenship rights. No longer 
can abstract political theories be developed without taking into account the context in 
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which they are to be applied. If conceptions of justice have become particularistic, it 
practically necessitates the need for a greater involvement by a diversity of social actors. 
It is clear that the contemporary demands placed upon political theory require it 
to consider the actual context in which it is to be applied. This proposal has implications 
for the communitarian project in Canada. While historically the idea of particular justice 
has been incorporated within Canada's political framework, it has only been in recent 
decades that the involvement in the discourse surrounding citizenship rights has become 
more inclusive. The demise of the Meech Lake Accord can be connected to a process of 
deliberation that was viewed as exclusionary in many respects. The ensuing 
Charlottetown Accord met with a similar response and was defeated by the public in a 
referendum. However, this attempt to build a consensus concerning the dissemination of 
cultural citizenship rights spawned a particular political phenomena. Specifically, it gave 
rise to regional political parties, the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party. Both these 
new political entities endorsed a conception of the good life that had differed from that 
espoused by Canada's traditional federal political parties. While the Bloc Quebecois 
primarily advocated for a particular regime of cultural citizenship rights, the Reform 
Party asserted that a change was necessary to the very mechanisms through which public 
discourse is carried out in Canada. This issue is discussed in more detail by David 
Laycock in "Institutions and Ideology in the Reform Party Project". He writes of the of 
the early years of the Reform Party, 
He (Preston Manning) suggests provlSlon for both binding and advisory 
referenda, in which voters could "express their views or directions with respect 
to certain key federal issues, especially major constitutional issues." Referenda 
should be timed to coincide with national elections, or possibility held at fixed 
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dates in the "mid-term." Manning also recommends minimally regulated 
"educational campaigns'" associated with the referenda, double majority 
decisions on most national referenda questions, provisions for citizen-initiated 
referenda with 3 per cent of electors signatures, and more work in 
developing a recall procedure "that will not be subject to abuse." He rejects the 
use of referenda to suspend particular sections of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.245 
While well intended, the political goals of the Reform Party have not been 
realized to the extend the originators and successors had intended. 
The rise of these two new political parties articulated new perspectives as to how 
cultural citizenship rights are to be distributed. While the Bloc Quebecois endorses a 
regime of citizenship rights that are solely articulated in a independent Quebec, the 
Reform Party articulated a limited form of cultural citizenship rights. Richard Sigurdson 
comments in "Preston Manning and the Politics of Post modem ism", 
... our political system is asked to respond to a variety of new demands for 
differential treatment based on the unique circumstances of aboriginals, 
women, homosexuals, ethno-cultural minorities, linguistic minorities, seniors, 
persons with disabilities and so forth. While many Canadians accept this new 
politics of difference, there has also been a reaction to it.246 
On the surface, the development of new political organizations may seem to have 
polarized the capacity of Canadians to articulate the common good. However, in reality 
the emergence and organized articulation of these particular notions of the good life 
furthers the communitarian project in Canada. In particular, they give voice to legitimate 
competing notions of the good life. In the process of developing a consensus 
surrounding the idea of the common good, new ideas must be examined and publicly 
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debated. At times this process can be contentious and divisive, but it serves a greater and 
long-term purpose in that it always allows the public to engage in a process of moral self-
examination. Regardless of the outcome of this deliberative process, the product is an 
active and open discourse. It must be considered that any public discourse may result in 
a dramatic shift in the social fabric. If Quebec is to achieve independence through an 
open and fair democratic process, then the product of the public discourse must be 
respected. 
The Canadian political experience is unique in that it incorporates both a notion 
of the collective good and an acknowledgment of particular cultural citizenship rights. 
Specifically, the idea of the common good is vested in the capacity of Canadians to 
engage in an open deliberative democratic process. While cultural citizenship rights may 
be distributed differentially, the process allows all social actors to have their opinion 
heard in the process of setting the national agenda. These principles conform to a 
communitarian perspective; however, it is somewhat dissimilar to the type of 
communitarianism endorsed by such scholars as Michael Sandel or Michael Walzer. The 
Canadian communitarian project explores the option of cultivating community beyond 
merely a local context. Canada can be described as communitarian in that it displays 
collectivist tendencies at a national level. However, the contemporary demands placed 
upon Canada are similar to those experienced by other nations. Traditional notions of 
justice espoused by liberal theorists such as John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin and post-
modernists such as Iris Marion Young do not necessarily provided the mechanisms 
demanded by the contemporary demands of citizenship. Consequently, the idea of 
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justice has become particular to each nation. While many other nations have struggled to 
address the cultural needs of its citizens, Canada has fared well. The mechanisms needed 
to address the contemporary demands of cultural citizenship have historically existed in 
Canada. The success of thecommunitarian project in Canada is based not on the actual 
development of a clear and distinct regime cultural citizenship rights, but the process 
upon which such rights are deliberated upon. John Ralston Saul describes this uniquely 
Canadian idea of determining the public good as "reasonable balance", a trait of our 
political culture that allows us to create counterweights to the often-varied conceptions of 
the common good.247 Yet Saul also laments that this delicate balancing act is being 
eroded by elites devaluing the public interest. With this, the products of our unique 
history, geography, and culture are being undermined. However, it is upon this point that 
Saul's argument fails. The future of Canada does not solely lie with the formative events 
of our history, formal institutions, political actors or academic observers, but with 
ordinary Canadians and their capacity for innovation and ever evolving understandings 
of the common good. The success of the Canadian experiment is based on the continued 
willingness of actors from a diversity of backgrounds to engage in a vibrant social 
discourse to manage constantly changing social realities. This is the essence of Canada 
and any just community. 
247 Saul, p. 507 
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